## 1NC

### 1NC- Kritik

#### Welcome to the church! All are open to confess their sins and atone for their white guilt. The antiblack sins of the past continue to plague our dark futures and the hell hole that is the project of the American dream. The 1AC’s expansion of US antitrust law is not a neutral endeavor but sustains the valorization of the American Dream and the US as the promised land for God’s chosen people.

**Bey 15** [Marquis Bey, Assistant Professor of African American Studies, 2015, Journal of Feminist Scholarship, Volume 9 Issue 9 Fall 2015, “She Had a Name That God Didn’t Give Her: Thinking the Body through Atheistic Black Radical Feminism”, pgs. 6-10, JMH] edited for racialized language\*

It is worth pointing out here the necessity of feminist Blackness. The embodiment of Blackness has profound (a)theological consequences. Historically, Blackness has signified inherent guilt, innate sin, and inner maleficence. Contemporarily, **Blackness still signifies that epidermal “confession” of guilt**. To be Black is to always be guilty of crime. Black bodies “weaponize sidewalks; shoot [them]selves while handcuffed in the back of police cars … [are] incarcerated, assaulted, and stopped and frisked for walking, driving, and breathing while black” (Sharpe 2014, 61). Citations of Black bodies gunned down for nothing more than the purported crime their skin confessed can persist for pages: Tarika Wilson, Rodney King, Sean Bell, Miriam Carey, Oscar Grant, Shantel Davis, Amadou Diallo, Nathaniel Jones, Tyisha Miller, Jordan Davis, Trayvon Martin, Sharmel Edwards, Ezell Ford, Renisha McBride, John Crawford, Eric Garner, Michael Brown, Vonderrit Myers…4 These slain Black victims were all subject to the circumscription of their humanity by the insidious white gaze—a manifestation of the transcendental signifier: god—and in the presence of this white gaze Black bodies appear “in the form of a sheer exteriority, implying that the Black body ‘shows up,’ makes itself known in terms of its Black surface” (Yancy 2008, 21). Under the white gaze, people like Garner and Brown are undifferentiated: “All Coons Look Alike to Me,” as the old song goes. Or religiously speaking, as one white Mississippi Yazoo Delta planter said, “I think God intended the ~~niggers~~ [black people] to be slaves. Now since man has deranged God’s plan, I think the best we can do is keep ‘em as near to a state of bondage as possible” (Oshinsky 1996, 11). The interiority of Black bodies undergoes abject erasure and becomes “ontologically mapped,” its cartographical coordinates leading “to that which is always immediately visible: the Black surface” (Yancy 2008, 21). The body, however, is not merely its materiality. It is never divorced from perception, interpretation, and consequently the actions based on those perceptions and interpretations. The body, in effect, is a text onto which scripts and meanings are inscribed. Bodies are the ways in which we constitute the knowledge of the world. The world appears to us through the body. Contrary to the religious mantra “be in the world but not of it,” which is a kind of world denial rooted in greater importance given to divine afterlife—as Eldridge Cleaver’s incarcerated context makes clear, “[religionists] could usher you through the Pearly Gates after you were dead, but not through the prison gate while you were still alive and kicking” (Cleaver 1999, 23; original emphasis)—bodies in the world are how we come to be the various aspects of our identities. One cannot be in the world and not of it, as many Christian discourses urge, since it is precisely because we are in the world that we are, and thus our existence and identities as such stem from our worldly in-ness. While the placards in protest of Brown’s murder read “Black Lives Matter,” I want to underscore that there is no life without the body. That is to say, Black lives can only matter if Black bodies matter first. As the philosopher Drew Leder remarks, “we cannot understand the meaning and form of objects without reference to the bodily powers through which we engage them…. The lived body is not just one thing in the world, but a way in which the world comes to be” (1992, 25). More originary is the body; the body precedes the life of that Black body, thus must be deemed important before the life can. Michael Brown, for instance, is put at war with his body. Extracted from his lived Black embodiment by the white gaze and deified by those who sought to use his death as a pseudocrucifixion, Brown in some sense was denied his enfleshment. The subtle relegation to a topos ouranios, a fate that has befallen many of the (largely male) aforementioned Black people, deemphasizes, in part, the fact that these bodies were born into the world, lived as Black, and died because of that fact. Not only was this characteristic accident (i.e., their incidental existence as Black-skinned) ontologized, it was done so outside of their Black bodies and, after their deaths, repositioned to T-shirts, memes, slogans, and causes. Let me be clear: I am not denigrating these efforts by any means. Black lives must be preserved in their deaths. The rise in poems and protests and activism in the name of Trayvon Martin and Mike Brown signifies the importance and value that Black lives have. What I wish to suggest is that if these victims are not kept in close relation with their lived bodily experiences, which exist in a continual chain of other lived Black experiences that have succumbed to similar fates, we run the risk of dissolving the body that was of utmost importance to their experiences. This kind of martyrdom extracted from the bodies of the martyrs is indicative of specific theological ideologies of denying the world, disassociating oneself from one’s flesh (“Our bodies are just shells for our souls. The body doesn’t matter,” my white Christian friend George once told me), or imprecise renditions of actual people, i.e., demigods and saints. The atheistic perspective of my proffered Black feminism ensures that this deification does not occur. To deify is, quite simply, to dehumanize. As far back as Emmett Till, slain Black bodies often become symbols that stretch across time and the entirety of the Black race, deindividuating the lived, particular, embodied lives of the victims in an effort to make them Christlike. Mamie Till Mobley, Emmett Till’s mother, wanted her son’s death to save other Black boys and men who could have undergone the same fate. This is indeed admirable and useful in a period of overt anti-Black vigilantism, but it still makes Till a Christ figure, no longer a 14-year-old boy who lived but a symbol—i.e., not a human with a body in the world—who saves everyone else through his own nonhumanness: death. **Only through abstraction, the taking of “souls,” do these Black bodies have value.** We must hold in front of us the corporeal, not the abstracted heavenly afterthoughts of pristine, eulogized lives. **We** **must not fall into the pattern of thinking of the dead as angels because, indeed, they were not**. As “the steel-blue ghost standing at the podium” said, “Vonderrit Myers was no angel.” No, he was not. He was human. He “had a name that god didn’t give him” (Bennett 2015). Joshua Bennett’s spoken-word poem “Still Life With Black Death” reveals the necessity of refraining from making angels and holy victims of murdered Black boys, Vonderrit Myers in particular, a Black 18-year-old killed in St. Louis by a police officer. “When he died,” says Bennett, he did not bleed starlight or gold. He was not half-bird. The gun spoke, and no flaxen wings shot from each shoulder as if to carry him beyond the bullet’s swift assignment— No, the boy was not a pillar of white smoke bright enough to break a nonbeliever, make a holy man fall prostrate, heaving, heavy with contrition. Here, Bennett enacts a profound refusal of making an angel or divine entity of Myers. Myers was not a heavenly angel (half-bird), nor did his death cause him to sprout “flaxen wings.” To claim so erases Myers’s humanness, his flawed, (Black-)fleshy, embodied vessel, which was the grounds for his murder. In order to maintain Myers’s ontological integrity, we cannot erase him by painting him as perfect. He must remain “no angel,” i.e., human, flawed. Only here can he be redeemed, because for Vonderrit Myers to be seen as himself he must be seen as he was—Black, human, and flawed. No angel. Bennett also urges listeners to reembody whiteness, unmoor it from its perceived transcendental perspective. The goal is not to reverse the statuses and imbue Myers and other Black bodies with holy omnipotence and divinity while white officers are condemned, demonized, and incarnated in visible white flesh. All must be embodied in themselves. Bennett continues and points to a white epistemology of ignorance and all-knowingness, asking, “How else to erase him if they cannot feign omnipotence, / lay claim to the sky, colonize heaven…” **Indeed, omnipotence, the limits of living (the sky), and the ultimate topos ouranios (heaven) are colonized by whiteness.** Thus they take on a status of unquestioned normality, the standard by which life is measured, and the ideological template structuring the world’s grammar. **What must occur is the reembodiment of the abstracted whiteness used to “colonize” the heavenly, standardizing realms.** Bennett does so by revealing the mundane humanness of Myers’s killer, a proxy for a murderous white gaze that truncates the subjectivity of Black bodies: That killer woke up today, probably ate scrambled eggs for breakfast, brushed his teeth three times or fewer, walked in soft slippers… Checked the mail while a child decomposed underground. Making an (a)theological shift, even though several historically Black denominations called for a “Black Lives Matter” Sunday, it is striking that a majority of churches were, for the most part, relatively silent on the matter.5 Professor of theology Brian Bantum asked poignant questions: “If theology does anything should it not at least speak to the realities that mark our lives together as human beings? And if this is the case, how can theology that confesses who God is, not also acknowledge the bodies that confess?” Bantum’s focus on the body’s importance is estimable. **Theology must not only attend to the body but, I would add, must also hold the body accountable.** This, I think, is where Bantum misses the mark: To do theology faithfully, confessionally, we must see how Christianity participates in the social realities of a broken world. We must acknowledge and confess the ways we fail to see ourselves, the world, and Christ faithfully. But we must also confess that in our blindness the eternal Word has come nonetheless. We must confess that we are like the blind who have been made to see, even if in our sight we do not yet understand the images that are before us. In this disorientation of a world that seems more familiar when we close our eyes and return to our broken state of blindness, hoping to regain a familiarity of a world filled only with touch and sound, we must have the courage to keep our eyes open. We must learn to hear anew in the encounter with faces and bodies. In a way, we must be born anew again and again. (Bantum 2014; original emphasis) Kudos to Bantum for shedding a prophetic light on the responsibility of Christianity. That he concedes that Christianity participates in social ills is a theological move that must become more widespread. That he also acknowledges the failures of Christians keeps the church accountable not only for its good deeds but also for its less-than-adequate efforts at times. But Bantum slips into an evasiveness. Admitting that “we’re blind and not living confessionally and prophetically,” which is true in the context of Christian thought, seems to also absolve god and Jesus of any responsibility. It is very common to attribute positive “blessings” in the world to god: good fortune bestowed upon the church in the form of money or larger venues, narrowly escaping a deadly car crash, or acing your calculus exam. But deities seem to be absolved of responsibility for misfortunes, and in fact justified by way of a mysterious plan that subsumes and puts a positive spin on the horrible event. This, however, is no new critique of theism. Atheists and freethinkers have leveled this critique countless times, and I do not intend to proffer it as novel. My intention from a standpoint that is Black and feminist and atheistic is to reveal the implications and consequences of such evasive thinking. Purportedly showing how believers can remedy the horrors of the world like the murder of Mike Brown, rather than not letting it happen in the first place, eschews the importance that would serve better being placed on preventative measures, and also fails, I think, to link Brown’s death with numerous similar historical events that were also not stopped, and thus becomes complicit in providing sanctioned precedent for the continuance of the criminalization of Black bodies. In other words, focusing on bearing honest witness to the troubles of the world and discussing how best to address and protest Brown’s killing—which, to be sure, are incredibly admirable actions that should be continued—deemphasizes the more desired outcome of the living body of Mike Brown. It also fails to adequately place Brown’s murder in a long chain of slain Black bodies killed on the basis of criminalized scripts imposed upon them, which potentially frames contemporary incidents as isolated. Mike Brown, in other words, was by no means the first and, unfortunately, not the last to be killed by white hands (or guns) on the basis of the signified meaning of his Blackness. In short, rather than holding god accountable for the numerous unjust murders of Black people in the practice’s centuries-long history, historical precedents are elided and the hot new murder is treated in a vacuum, god once again not being forced to bear the responsibility for, in part, enabling the historical struggle of Black people living under the murderous gaze of militarized whiteness**. God does not value the embodied lives of Black people, as they only become divinely valid through death. God is one who does not make us “larger, freer, and more loving,” so, by Baldwin’s logic, “it is time we got rid of Him [sic]” (1993, 47).** And this captures what is meant by atheistic feminist Blackness. **So what would it mean to “Blacken” god, to make god and Jesus “Black like me”?** **What might happen if god or Jesus were to become incarnate in the world through the suffering of Black bodies? What would it mean, as this section’s heading asks, for Jesus to be unable to breathe?** Jesus, in effect, is suffocating just like the asthmatic Eric Garner who was put in an (illegal) chokehold by police officers and killed as a result. As one Twitter commenter said, “A state that can choke a man to death, on video, for selling cigarettes is NOT Rom. 13 justice” (Rom. 13:1–2: “1 Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. 2 Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation”). Rev. Jeff Hood made this comment: “I keep thinking about Eric Garner saying, ‘I can’t breathe.’ It made me think—that’s what Jesus is saying in this culture. Jesus is fundamentally connected to the marginalized and right now Jesus is saying, ‘I can’t breathe’” (Kuruvilla and Blumberg 2014). Jesus here is mortalized, returned to his body, Blackened, and made in the image of Eric Garner, a reversal of the originary divine god-like fashioning of humanity. The move has atheological resonances—**god and Jesus must die; hence they must become mortal if they are to exist, they must suffocate. And with god dead, we have atheism**. **One can say that god is this suffocation precisely because god is deemed immortal—god is death, the antithesis of mortality and finitude. God’s supposed immortality is inseparable from absolute immortality**. In bringing Jesus to mortality through Garner, Rev. Hood’s remark attempts to kill god. Indeed, he must die if he is to be able to be seen in likeness to Garner and other Black bodies. The affirmation of life, the crux of atheistic feminist Blackness, entails the affirmation of mortality. It values bodily being. Consequently, affirming life and mortality—the condition of life—means denouncing immortality, denouncing death—god godself. To paraphrase Langston Hughes’s poem “Dear Lovely Death,” “Dear lovely Death, [god] is thy other name.”6 With this affirmation of Black life inevitably comes fear. Philosopher Jacques Derrida reminds us that the “unconditional affirmation of life,” in which “survival is the most intense life possible,” is filled with pain and fear precisely because of one’s decision to live; life rests on the condition of its own eradication around every corner (quoted in Hägglund 2008, 34). For Black bodies, however, that fear is intensified, heightened because of the way that Black bodies are “seen” as perpetually and inherently criminal, gazed upon not as themselves but as static racial molds that exist ahead of themselves in the white gaze. But this is a negation of Black life since Black lives cannot be affirmed in and of themselves; their ontological value is circumscribed. **So in order to affirm all lives, especially Black lives, they must first exist for themselves rather than as fixed images in the hegemonic purview. This is even more the case with female and trans bodies.**

#### The divine deus ex machina of fiat will never bring about black liberation. Only through the rejection of such narratives can black life live without the invocation of white humanist move towards divinity.

Butler 19 [Philip Butler, Assistant Professor of Theology and Black Posthuman and Artificial Intelligence Systems at the Iliff School of Theology, December 12, 2019, “Black Transhuman Liberation Theology”, pg. 139-145, JMH]

Here is the most important thing to remember—**God is not coming to liberate**. Black transhuman liberation theology assumes that God is not coming to save Black folks from tyranny. **There are too many instances in history where God did not intervene on the side of the oppressed**—Egypt, Jewish conquest(s), Babylonian conquest(s), Rome, The Ottoman Empire, Persia, the Crusades, Colonialism, genocide (pick one), Antebellum Slavery, the Holocaust, Rwanda, Biko Haram, Libya, Sudan, etc. Now, there may be a significant contingent of Black folks that would attest to the demonstration of God’s power in their individual lives. I do not contest that. I too have had countless instances where God has shown up in my life. I would compare these individual instances of God’s demonstrable power to act in the world to events that occur at the quantum level (using physics terminology). On the quantum level, physical anomalies occur that are not easily demonstrable or replicable at the level of perception. Likewise, while God has demonstrated God’s ability on the individual level, the individual level is incommensurate to the level of whole societies, cultures, and the trajectory of history. **God has not interrupted history on the larger levels that comprise societal relationality.** One could argue that the Allied powers were an example of God showing up for a historicized group. Even if I were to go along with that, how many Jewish folks had to die before God could intervene? That still is not an instance of God saving Black folks from a regime. This is not to say God is not capable, or that God is unwilling. This is simply a rethinking of the way that God participates in the material world based on an honest assessment of history. And if that were the case, **God has not shown up for** the entirety of Black folks. We just “celebrated” **400 years of shitty tyranny in the United States**. Anthony Pinn would suggest that the use of the term “God” is not even necessary in the conversation of liberation.29 Some folks who embody the spirit of revolt may not even believe in God. That is perfectly fine. Let us remember that this theistic transhumanist approach accepts multiple iterations of belief. It affirms other terms for the word “God.” The term “God,” “Spirit,” “Self,” that which is beyond the Self, etc., is useful in this proposition because although the action of people are responsible for cultivating the condition of people, something has to be the thrust for biotechnological action. Here we reinsert the vitalistic qualities of the body’s electrochemistry as the causal agent within human biotechnology. Theologically, there has to be a causal agent, or that which infuses action. Historically this causal agent has been understood through classical designations (God, Spirit, universe, community, vitality, etc.). For the sake of Black transhuman liberation theology, these blanket terms are classified as sacred entities. In this theistic transhumanism grounded in biology sacred entities, or the thrust behind embodied action, are defined as the electrochemical response of the body. Again, the electrochemical response of the body is the impetus for thought, action, intention, etc. In order for this vitalistic assertion to be maintained we must remember these entities are present through electrochemistry while enlivening biological systems. The panpsychic animism of this theistic transhumanism would still allow for these entities to manifest in other ways to maintain the integrity of nonbiological systems as they fight against entropy. Thus, as the bearer of various names which fall under the vitalist umbrella, sacred entities give space for bodies to be cultivated through social relationships and personal perception. So, even though the electrochemical response is a secondary action, it is entangled with vitality, previous personal responses, and experiences. The Spirit/God/that which is beyond the Self/any other sacred entity creates space for personally cultivated iterations of embodiment over time. This cultivation is based on an individual or community’s experience with the combination of their sacred entity and the world—even if the self is their sacred entity. This is in recognition of the material aspects of divinity in nature and in biology. They are inseparable because sacred entities are not someone else or somewhere else.30 They become incarnate within physical systems, and in this case Black biotechnological systems. Conceptualizing Black folks as biotechnology proposes that vitality (functioning as the body’s electrical impulse) situates heart rhythms, sets neurons and muscles into motion, and initiates the body’s biochemistry, while creating individual and communally transposed emotionality—the spiritual disposition. Black transhuman liberation theology claims that vitality is the indeterministic causal agent. **Life is indeterminately vital. More plainly, Black life is vital**. And for Black transhuman liberation theology, the origin of the vitalistic spring which creates space for the electrical pulse grounding Black biotechnological life is not a major concern. **Because for this theology, what someone does with their life is much more important than where that life originates**. However, some might argue that life’s origin matters because people may want to pay homage to the giver of life. To that I would say that due to concepts of relationality, it may be best to live in a way that brings honor to those who are directly responsible for your life—such as parents and grandparents. This would also speak to one’s identity (community, ethnicity, gender, etc.). Some might even suggest that a declaration of futility regarding the need to search for causality is problematic. However, I would suggest that the need for a declaration of causality is an attempt to assert control over questions whose answers are not readily available. More specifically, I would propose that whatever belief system someone chooses is constructed according to the parameters of satisfaction that coincide with their cognitive operators which situate reality for them. Essentially, belief systems represent the collection of internally cohesive intellectual systematics that help one selfidentify in the midst of a complex and often unintelligible/ineffable world. So, as the causal agent, the body’s electricity becomes the materialization of the vital presence giving life to all on earth. As alluded to earlier, electricity bound to Black biotechnology carries transmitters and hormones. It transports feelings and thoughts that influence perception and subsequent action. The biological undercurrent of electricity is the primary characteristic of the central nervous system (CNS), whether it is fully functioning or not. Black transhuman liberation theology understands the influential capacity of electricity in the body and the influence of spirituality on its electrical rhythms. This theology works to actively merge Black spirituality and technology for the enhanced synchrony of Black biotechnology—as it undertakes its freedom work. It asserts that biological synchrony is a necessary component for cultivating one’s spiritual disposition. Black transhuman liberation theology also recognizes the importance of intentionality in the task of sustaining the spiritual disposition of biotechnological capital while undertaking the greater work of actualizing freedom. The proliferation of access to information, education, and technology places the onus on Black folks to begin participating in the current cohort already shaping new technologically grounded governing bodies. Black transhuman liberation theology advocates for Black folks to partake in the technocratic formation of the future. If Black folks refuse to utilize Black biotechnology to learn the necessary prerequisites for participation in the technological accrual of power then Black folks will continue to be relegated to a constant status of fear, survival, and struggle. Black transhuman liberation theology takes seriously the genetic capacity of biotechnological embodiment to learn, adapt, create, and enhance both itself and the environment it inhabits. It **employs spirituality to begin unlocking generative epigenetics inherent with Black collective memory which recalls ancestral capacities to innovate within STEM fields**.31 Drawing from extensive ancestral lines of STEM-based innovation, Black transhuman liberation theology encourages Black biotechnology to create technological advancements and organizations capable of employing other Black bodies. This tactic is meant to cultivate dignity while accumulating power. Black transhuman liberation theology calls upon scientific wisdom to generatively influence the genetic regulation of spiritual embodiment, which primes the body for the work of liberation. I submit that the Black theology’s history of deconstructing power/colonial systems is closely correlated to the inability of Black folks to assert their will against preexisting power structures. Challenging harmful theologies while asserting theological self-worth has been a radical way to face oppressive structures. The act of rethinking and redefining the world, which begins with an engagement of overarching epistemologies, is a valid approach to liberation. **Black transhuman liberation theology owes its framework to the work of Black and decolonial scholars who precede its construction**. However, the act of theoretically deconstructing power also falls within the realm of revolts, marches, and other attempts to engage oppression. I think if these creative and artistic ways of expression were actually capable of freedom making, then theological and sociological conversations would carry a different tenor. **History has shown time and again that radical acts of disobedience, nonviolent or violent, have very rarely created the kind of change that oppressed and marginalized people really want**. Over the course of history, freedom has only come to oppressed peoples on the backs of violent resistance. The American Revolution, the French Revolution, and the Haitian Revolution are all examples in recent history where people were able to free themselves. Yet, two of these three revolutions are celebrated and viewed in the light of humanity and civility. The Haitian Revolution is demonized and vilified, evidenced by the manner in which other countries conduct business with Haiti, the threats of aggression made against it (i.e., the US occupation), and through the international sanctions it has received.32 **Haiti is ostracized because it burned its bridge to whiteness—its bridge to humanity.** Nevertheless, with the multitude of theoretical deconstructions of power, there are not many theories that reflect on ways for the oppressed to procure real power. This “real power” that I reference refers to the concrete political, economic, and social power that allows for consequential decision-making. “Power” is a difficult term to wrestle with. Since the oppressed are primarily the actors of theoretical deconstruction, power is mainly presented as an evil, and many theorize to empower the oppressed, which has a very different end.33 Empowerment and power are not the same. Black transhuman liberation theology theorizes ways for the oppressed to secure power in this life. Critical theorists suggest that power acquisition only reproduces power structures, calcifying structurally oppressive components that uphold current forms of power.34 The truth of this statement has been used within religious circles to justify letting God handle the situation. **But since God is not coming to help, Black folks must assume the active role of freeing themselves through concrete means that are spiritually grounded**. Even if there were a theology juxtaposing God’s ability to help while maintaining the importance of embodied action, the dependence upon embodied action to predicate God’s help presupposes some imaginative position. This imaginative position, or checkpoint, is one that would suddenly unlock God’s helpfulness. The obscure nature surrounding the timing of when God might enter history to act on behalf of the oppressed is an extension of theological thought that insists upon the immaculate nature of the hereafter. It is also too reminiscent of the process by which justice and liberty are dispersed to Black folks in America—with an emphasis on waiting and right behavior (all limitations attached to what good humans do). **A recognition of the nondeterministic nature of God’s life force accounts for the weight of biotechnology to act in every facet of existence. It also provides intellectual congruity for concerns regarding the historical vantage point that does not see God as liberator**. Liberation comes through intentional action from people, which is the very foundation of the Black transhumanist liberation theological perspective. Although God shows up in various ways on the individual level, people have to show up at the larger level of complex interpersonal geopolitical power systems.

#### The impact is divine racism. The state is the vehicle through which their racist God cements violence and enslavement onto Black life. So long as we continue to rely on these antiblack technologies the White racist God will continue to exert his hegemonic power.

**Finley and Gray 15** [Stephen Finley, associate professor of religious studies and African and African American Studies at LSU, Biko Mandela Gray, Assistant Professor of Religion, African American Studies, and Women’s and Gender Studies at Syracuse, 2015, Penn State University Press, “God is a White Racist: Immanent Atheism as a Religious Response to Black Lives Matter and State-Sanctioned Anti-Black Violence”, pgs. 445-448, JMH]

If, as Lewis Gordon points out, Blackness is “the theodicy of European modernity”—and here we extend his reflections on Europe to apply to the United States and other societies wherein Africana peoples are situated as well—then the question of Black life mattering in an anti-Black world gives way to a theodicean mode of questioning because theodicy is, in part, a question about how (Black) lives come to matter within larger normative social contexts.6 William Jones’s work provides some clarification, as he compellingly explored theodicy in his seminal text, Is God a White Racist?7 Jones’s concern with theodicy emerged from his attention to what he called “ethnic suffering”— an intergenerational and enduring form of suffering directed toward and concentrated on one ethnic or racial group. **Such suffering prompts reflection about the cause of suffering and death, which in turn raises questions concerning a person’s (or people’s) relationship to the divine—that is, how the divine perceives and relates to their presence**: in other words, **how they matter to the divine.** Jones directed his attention at his contemporary Black theological counterparts who contended that God is on the side of Black people, working out their liberation from white oppression in a final exaltation or liberation event.8 Jones contends that this position is untenable. **Given the historical record, one can never be sure that God was and is working on behalf of African Americans and against oppression**. Jones argues that since God is the sum of God’s acts, the persistence of ethnic suffering made it appear that Black people only mattered negatively to God—which is say, in the language of Julia Kristeva’s Powers of Horror, **Black people were abject.**9 History did not disclose a God who affirmed the worth and validity of Black life, but rather revealed a God who not only allowed but occasioned and sanctioned the repression and elimination of Black life over extended periods of time.10 Jones thus wondered whether God was—and is—a white racist, for, **as Gordon highlights, race, and particularly Blackness, is about who lives and who dies, whose “showing up” requires their sustained existence and whose “showing up” requires their being-consumed and being-discarded.11** We extend Jones’s theodicean reflections to speak about a more immanent concern—that is, **the state functioning as god**, who, as the ultimate arbiter of guilt or innocence, wields the near-absolute power and authority to do imminent harm to Africana peoples. **Gordon is helpful here: “Even secular societies may have a theodicean mode of rationalization, where the society itself or some system of treasured knowledge or values occupies the deific role.”**12 Gordon traces the theodicean line of questioning historically; he connects it to the question of race, ultimately showing that race was about what was natural and what was outside of the natural order. Blackness, as that which was supposed to be outside of the natural order, fell outside the purview of normativity, rendering it something to be eliminated (again, Kristeva’s “abjection”). He thus **concludes with the quote that began this section: “Blackness is fundamental to the formation of European modernityas it is one that imagines itself legitimate and pure through the expurgation of Blackness**. It is, in other words, the theodicy of European modernity.”13 Black life, thus, **has come to matter negatively within the context of our sociopolitical life, emerging as always already guilty in the eyes of a state that sanctions Black death as necessary to the maintenance of social order**—in other words, as a theodicy or defense of the goodness and sanctity of the state: the state-as-god is a white racist! one of the primary reasons we understand the state as god is because the state, like God in God’s response to Job out of the whirlwind, protects itself against any self-indictment.14 Consider, for example, President obama’s rather apologetic remarks during his recent “Selma” speech: Just this week, I was asked whether I thought the Department of Justice’s Ferguson report shows that, with respect to race, little has changed in this country. And I understood the question; the report’s narrative was sadly familiar. It evoked the kind of abuse and disregard for citizens that spawned the Civil Rights Movement. But I rejected the notion that nothing’s changed. What happened in Ferguson may not be unique, but it’s no longer endemic. It’s no longer sanctioned by law or by custom. 15 Either the president is incorrect in his interpretation of state-sanctioned violence against Black people, or he totally misses how such sanctioning functions and the various modalities of sanction that justify Black death. Despite his claims, violence against Black bodies is a matter of law and custom; that police officers or white citizens acting in the mode of policing are rarely, if ever, charged with a crime and are even less commonly convicted when they are tried is an indication of state sanction, custom, and general consent. Consider the Mike Brown case in Ferguson. Darren Wilson (the officer who killed Mike Brown) claimed that Brown was so angry that he looked like a demon and therefore that Wilson had to kill him for fear of his life. Invoking the demonic ultimately occasioned eliminating the demonic for the sake of maintaining the good and valued (read: “white” and privileged) collectives of the society.16 The hyperbole of Brown’s demonic anger was ultimately translated into and served as a rationalization for his own death, and occasioned Wilson’s non-indictment. By not indicting Wilson, the state sanctioned his actions, absolving him of guilt and rendering him an acolyte—an agent of the deified state, who, with his gun, ceremoniously and theodically cleansed the society of a known contagion.17 But the problem with this scene is that Brown’s disposition—whether angry or not, we will never know, now that he is no longer with us—was instantiated not by Brown, but by Wilson. The Ferguson case invokes philosopher Louis Althusser’s doctrine of interpellation, wherein an officer of the state calls a person into being by hailing that person. This occurs, however, only to subject that being to the state’s ideological constraints and structures.18 Althusser’s doctrine is interestingly qualified by a footnote: “Hailing . . . takes a quite ‘special’ form in the policeman’s practice of ‘hailing’ which concerns the hailing of ‘suspects.’”19 The scene of interpellation is one that, as Judith Butler highlights, inscribes guilt on the hailed; as a matter of fact, guilt is the condition for the possibility of hailing, and thus the condition for the possibility of subjectivity within the structures of the state.20 Responding to the hailing is, therefore, a self-ascription of guilt**. If theodicy is the defense of God’s goodness and power, then police hailing is a theodicean venture, as it upholds the goodness and power of the state-as-god over against the life of individuals.** The interpellation of Black people, reduced to their Black bodies by police officers and “neighborhood watch officers,” traps Black people in the realm of the always-already guilty—again, a juridico-political form of mattering negatively within our contemporary context. **Within this anti-Black world then, Black lives matter negatively to the state**. **The state, acting as a form of absolute divine sovereignty, is a divine racist, and a world wherein the state-as-god is a white racist requires**, on the part of those of us who have been kissed by the sun, a different disposition— one that affirms the positive mattering of Black life at all costs. This disposition pushes against the state-as-god, the god-state, by refusing to give it analytic and normative legitimacy. We call this disposition immanent atheism.

#### The 1AC’s invocation of nurses as a move towards black liberation participates in the practice of iconography whereby black people are turned into icons and superheroes. This not only deradicalizes any praxis the aff energizes but it also represents as an iconographic act of pornotroping black success stories as a move toward divine liberation.

Anthanasopolous-Sugino’19 (Second-year graduate student Charles Athanasopoulos-Sugino has recently been published in the Prose Studies: History, Theory, Criticism. Their article titled “Smashing the icon of Black Lives Matter: afropessimism & religious iconolatry” seeks to intervene in the critical conversations surrounding Black Lives Matter (BLM) to urge scholars to challenge the very political calculus from which we (dis)count lives and ascribe value or matter as a mechanism of anti-Black power. This essay argues that we must abandon the axiological framework of the Human, by situating the Human as the centerpiece of rituals of anti-Blackness that occur in the most basic of social interactions. In exploring ritual at the core of its operations Athanasopoulos-Sugino argues that anti-Blackness should be understood as a religious system. ““Smashing the icon of Black Lives Matter: afropessimism & religious iconolatry” 2019)NAE

My aim here is to describe how ritual functions to maintain religions absent the explicit proclamation of belief, and that ritual and religion are a lens from which we can interpret both the upholding of the anti-Black status quo and the acts of resistance that seek to challenge it. Icons are usually understood in their specific Christian context regarding the dispute between iconolatry, which argued Christians should intensely venerate religious paintings as material manifestations of God, and iconoclasm which argued that these images should be shattered because they cannot capture the transcendent nature of God (Shedlock; Ostrogorsky). Yet, I would like to part from this narrow definition of the debate and instead push us to think of icons beyond their literal meaning for the Church. Εικονολατρία (icono-latria) is the etymological fusion of two Greek words Εικόνα (icona) meaning icon and Λατρεία (latria) meaning love or worship. Iconolatry is thus the process of falling in love with an icon through ritual adoration. I am arguing that we should understand icons as being able to manifest as images, texts, speeches, movements, and statues insofar as they are symbols that inspire the ritualistic affirmation of Civil Society through a negation of Blackness. This broader definition would allow us to properly situate the Marine rifleman’s weapon as one icon of Judeo-Christianity and American freedom along with other icons such as the Statue of Liberty and the American flag, or the statue of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in Washington D.C. as an icon of racial progress in the United States. The importance of centering iconolatry is highlighting how these icons lull Blacks and non-Blacks alike into a pacified state of celebration and optimism through a narrative of gradual progress and feel-good politics so that we even want to become icons ourselves. In addition, I am attempting to push scholars of rhetoric and Blackness to conceptualize anti-Blackness as a religion and BLM as a form of liberation theology. In locating BLM as a liberation theology in the face of the religion of anti-Blackness, it is important to highlight how ritual and faith play a part in their organizing. Many BLM activists explain that faith and spirituality play a pivotal role insofar as Christian theology embeds a ritual practice of activism by “letting the Word [of God] push you” (Edgar and Johnson 47). One could argue that BLM as a liberation theology is attempting to shatter icons of white supremacy and establish its own icons that affirm the humanity of Black people. One example of this is how BLM has attempted to shatter the icon of the police officer by exposing the brutality inflicted on Black people at the hand of law enforcement or how Colin Kaepernick’s kneeling during the national anthem is an act of shattering the icon of the American flag. In both examples, there is a rupture that occurs in the fabric of Civil Society as a sacred icon (the police officer and the American flag) is desecrated in order to highlight the suffering of Black people. This rupture holds the potential to overturn the axiological framework established within this Human community, which is why there is such a fervent need to enact rituals to recover the value of these icons in the responses to BLM and Kaepernick. In what follows, I parse out how the lens of ritual can help us think through the nuances of BLM and how this reveals certain constraints and affordances given to us through the embracement of this banner of resistance which I filter through a discussion of the utility of Humanism. I argue that while post-racial logics are detrimental to liberation efforts, we must also be wary of how multiculturalism offers us the temporary reprieve of feel-good politics without truly confronting the ontological negation of Blackness. Moreover, I argue that BLM as an icon has been taken up in ways that fortify this multiculturalist obfuscation of anti-Blackness revealing how the icon has now transcended the original intentions of its founders/actors. Humanism, Black Lives Matter as Icon BLM has served as a liberation theology to those who feel the weight of the anti-Black world. BLM began as a hashtag created by three Black queer women in the wake of Trayvon Martin’s murder in 2013, even though it wasn’t until after Mike Brown was killed that it became widely circulated on social media and transformed into what it is today. Bailey and Leonard explore how the statement “Black Lives Matter” embodies a deep Black love that challenges white supremacy and offers Black people an opportunity to attain liberty and the capacity for the pursuit of happiness (69). Like any theological faction that emerges, we cannot totalize BLM as one singular movement due to its decentralized form. In fact, at the core its political theology, the movement has attempted to shatter the older model of civil rights and Black power activism. Garza’s herstory of BLM helps us to understand how the movement seeks to move away from singular charismatic male leadership models in favor of a Black feminist work that shares in collective leadership as well as challenges single-issue movements by arguing that we should think about racialized bodies as inherently queer, which would produce an alliance based in oppositional politics (Cohen and Jackson 777). In this way, BLM shatters the icons of resistance that existed before it and establishes its own model. This model has reinvigorated confrontation politics and new grassroots resistance and has the potential to reverse the counter-movements that undid progress after the 60s and 70s, and that BLM needs to draw on and modernize popular insurgency in order to move beyond failures of groups like Occupy. While the more democratic leadership established by BLM has its upsides, it also engenders more confusion over the direction of the cause which is centered over whether BLM should engage in mass action or political reform (Rickford 39). Some activists prefer to engage with politicians such as Hilary Clinton and see value in focusing on specific policy reforms (Greenblatt). On the other hand, there are BLM activists who prefer to completely disavow electoral politics and capitalism in favor of disruptive politics that break down the smooth functioning of Civil Society. The heterogeneity of BLM highlights the struggle between the more radical elements of the group as the process of converting BLM to a more mainstream icon of resistance increases in intensity and encourages the disavowal of those factions seen as being destructive to the movement. Amidst this internal struggle BLM has also encountered a good amount of pushback from more mainstream liberal and conservative theo-political factions. For example, a former member of SNCC Rev. Dr. Barbara Reynolds has openly denigrated BLM by arguing that she cannot tell the difference between the legitimate activists and mobs who’d prefer to burn and loot. At the same time, All Lives Matter supporters frame BLM as violent and guilty of victimizing other people because of the constant disruptions that allow ALM a moral high ground in popular culture as being the group that affirms life (Edgar and Johnson 31-32). In fact, many ALM supporters argue that BLM’s slogan is an act of self-segregation that stirs racial tensions (33-34). Thus, BLM activists are being pushed by some of the older civil rights activists and more mainstream groups to legitimize its movement by meeting their threshold of civil and respectable politics. This outside pressure fuels the disavowal of more radical elements of the movement buttressed by the argument that integration into the mainstream is the only way to effectively mobilize. Alongside this political debate there is a clear attempt to appease the base of BLM in order to pacify the masses who could otherwise potentially be persuaded to support the more radical factions of the movement. This has largely happened through the commercialization of BLM in order to convert the movement into a mainstream icon of resistance. One example of this is a Rolling Stone Magazine article released on July 13th, 2016 titled “Songs of Black Lives Matter: 22 New Protest Anthems” (Grant and Spanos). There’s also the infamous Pepsi commercial, the string of Nike campaigns featuring Black athletes, and a slew of mainstream politicians such as Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, and Elizabeth Warren, who take up the BLM mantle in a variety of ways (Victor; Velshi; Nguyen; Barron-Lopez; Glanton). Indeed, BLM is a cultural icon whose proper interpretation is hotly contested in everyday personal, social media, political, and activist circles even as anti-Black institutions have attempted to assimilate BLM into their own grammar. I am arguing that this pressure to become more respected in mainstream politics along with this internal strife has contributed to the de-radicalization of Black Lives Matter and its consumption by more mainstream social justice organizing efforts that ritually invoke the icon of BLM such as the rally I attended. This situation demonstrates how icons take on lives of their own that transcend the original intentions of those who created them. Early Christians couldn’t have known that the cross would be taken up as a symbol of Constantine’s empire. Hindu practitioners couldn’t have known that the swastika would be taken up by one of the most vicious fascist regimes in history. Colin Kaepernick couldn’t have originally known that his protest by kneeling would become a centerpiece in a marketing campaign for Nike, and Black Lives Matter couldn’t have known it would become an icon deployed in tv commercials and as a talking point for presidential candidates. Whether the original creators of these icons play a part in this or not, it is undeniable that icons become distorted in this process whether it be from negative backlash or new supporters. The civil rights movement of the 1960s is the perfect example of this kind of distortion in how the movement is misremembered to bolster a particular perspective of social movements, making it hard to fully trace its historical legacy (Edgar and Johnson 3). These narratives erase the more radical factions of the movement by reducing everything to a prophetic individual tale of heroism (e.g. Dr. King, Malcolm X) and ultimately a narrative of American progress. While it is true that Dr. King’s politics of non-violence, love, and reconciliation made his legacy more susceptible the ritual conversion I am articulating, it is also true that these narratives erase his radical anti-war politics during the Vietnam war and his communist ideology. This is how conservatives are able to invoke Dr. King’s I Have a Dream speech in order to fortify claims of white victimization and meritocracy, or how older civil rights veterans are able to claim Dr. King wouldn’t support the undisciplined and raucous nature of BLM. In the case of Dr. King, his image is not converted into an icon until after his death. However, it is important that we pay attention to how this is happening to BLM right in front of us because “The dangers of this misappropriation of ‘King-as-icon’ and his legacy are illustrative of the ways in which facts and historical figures are distorted and in which iconolatry is substituted for reasoned argument” (Turner 108). Despite its efforts to shatter icons such as the police officer, the American flag, and the civil rights model of organizing, BLM-as-icon has also fallen victim to the iconolatry that the movement was originally attempting to escape. My argument is that BLM’s embracement of Humanism is the primary reason that it has been so easy to structurally adjust this liberation theology into an icon of anti-Blackness. Whereas BLM has opened ruptures in the fabric of Civil Society through its shattering of icons, it fails to use this rupture in order to energize a demand for the end of Civil Society as we know it. Instead, BLM makes the mistake of attempting to iconize Black activists as worthy of veneration instead of purely focusing on the smashing of all icons. Put another way, instead of arguing that we must reject the axiological framework of how life is valued as mattering, this movement merely seeks to include Black lives into this Humanist framework. In this way, BLM is much closer to the ideology of All Lives Matter than some would care to admit insofar as they both agree that all Human life should be valued despite the fact that BLM indicts ALM for its postracial fantasy that this goal has been achieved. BLM’s herstory makes explicit their belief in Humanism by making clear that Black Lives Matter is an ideological and political intervention in a world where Black lives are systematically and intentionally targeted for demise. It is an affirmation of Black folks’ humanity, our contributions to this society, and our resilience in the face of deadly oppression (Garza). What strikes me most is the desire to have members of Civil Society recognize the contributions of Black people. This declaration invites the mainstream world to include Blackness in its celebrations and to recognize Black Humanity. It is a demand to not be seen as pathological. Yet, this demand for recognition of suffering and resilience is exactly what neoliberal anti-Blackness uses in order to churn out commercials, playlists, and political campaigns that profess solidarity in order to pacify more radical resistance. Many scholars would disagree with my characterization of Humanism as destructive, and instead argue that iconolatry could be good. For example, some have argued that producing icons that project power and agency for Black people is a challenge to the “controlling images” of Black people in favor of a “Black oppositional aesthetic” that ruptures our experience of the visual through the establishment of a photographic counter-archive of the BLM movement (Schneider 2-4). Yet, this projection of power and agency is easily integrated into neoliberal anti-Blackness insofar as it can be commercialized. BLM’s official website demonstrates this most clearly in the section it has dedicated to the sale of merchandise. In this section one has the option of purchasing apparel (various shirts and sweaters) or accessories (coffee mugs, bracelets, and laptop stickers), as well as reading more about the featured artists who BLM has partnered with to create its designs (Black Lives Matter, "Shop"). One such artist, Hebru Brantley, attempts to create “narrative driven work revolving around his conceptualized iconic characters. Brantley utilizes these iconic characters to address complex ideas around nostalgia, the mental psyche, power and hope”.[[1]](#footnote-1) Here we can see an explicit move to create new Black icons for veneration in BLM-affiliated artists and activists. This iconicity is part of the larger attempt to integrate into the mainstream which is highlighted by a public service announcement put out by BLM on its website featuring Hollywood actor Kendrick Sampson who proclaims that the Black future is restorative, inclusive, and progressive (Black Lives Matter, “#BlackFutureIs”). This discourse of inclusivity, progress, and restoration can easily be appropriate

#### Against this, the alternative is a call to kill God. Reject the transcendental promise of liberation via divine intervention in favor of taking up the project of killing God and his White acolytes.

**Finley and Gray 15** [Stephen Finley, associate professor of religious studies and African and African American Studies at LSU, Biko Mandela Gray, Assistant Professor of Religion, African American Studies, and Women’s and Gender Studies at Syracuse, 2015, Penn State University Press, “God is a White Racist: Immanent Atheism as a Religious Response to Black Lives Matter and State-Sanctioned Anti-Black Violence”, pgs. 445-448, JMH]

Largely influenced by Jones’s work on theodicy, theologian Anthony Pinn developed a sophisticated theological system he calls African American nontheistic humanism. Within his system, “God” is merely a term that has run its course anachronistically and remains as unhelpful residue of humanity’s archaic past.21 Pinn’s nontheistic stance emerges from a sustained and critical wrestling with the damage the God-construct has done to African American communities, in particular. One of his most important yet underappreciated critiques of divinity is situated in his reading of the biblical narrative of the tower of Babel. Consider his remarks in The End of God Talk: “one can reasonably argue that, through the building of the Tower [of Babel], Nimrod rebels against a certain type of metaphysically imposed limitation on human creativity and action. Mindful of this alternative read, African American nontheistic humanist theology highlights the story of nimrod for its anthropological merits by positing God as the metasymbol of restraint. **Restraint is God.”**22 For Pinn, God is a form of absolute restraint, a divine impediment to human collective creativity and freedom. We find in both Jones’s and Pinn’s work analytic and normative tools to develop immanent atheism. However, **finding the metaphysically transcendent God to be a distraction from the pressing and more concrete context of human life and existence**, **we highlight the god—**the being whose legitimacy and goodness should not be questioned and who emerges as the ultimate arbiter of guilt and innocence within the context of human experience**—with whom Black people must wrestle immanently: the state-as-god**. This god is a sociopolitical manifestation of restraint that, at best, holds back the mobility, creativity, and freedom of Black people and, at worst, eliminates them as affronts to the status quo, which is to say, kills them both existentially and biologically. Following James Cone’s injunction to “kill Gods that don’t belong to the black community” and applying insights from Jones and Pinn, immanent atheism rejects the legitimacy of the state-as-god by deconstructing the theo-logic of the state and subsequently rejecting the legitimacy of the state’s icons and idols. Immanent atheism deconstructs the myths, symbols, and national narratives of a state that operates as the ultimate arbiter of how certain groups come to matter by climbing beneath these narratives, symbols, and myths to uncover the originary set of sources that conditioned the state’s emergence as a god-construct. We turn the United States here as a case study. In Significations: Signs, Symbols, and Images in the Study of Religion, historian of religions Charles Long deconstructs the theo-logic of America, contending that America, by failing to be reflexive, self-aware, and honest about its violent origins—in particular in its relation to native Americans and African Americans—becomes unable to provide an internal critique about its inconsistencies and internal contradictions, and therefore keeps itself from reconciling the gap between itss linguistic and mythological aspects and its actual history.23 Consider President obama’s comments we referenced above. obama articulates a “better” America that no longer legally sanctions the death of or violence against Black people. The president’s statement functions in service of continued state domination by upholding narratives and mythologies that position the state as progressively good. Immanent atheist deconstruction pushes through Obama’s narrative of progress and highlights that his “better” America is made possible by cheap prison labor and a justice system that has not been able to indict its police force, even in light of incontrovertible evidence of their unlawful and extrajudicial activities. Refusing to acknowledge the horrendous structures maintaining the state’s ultimate legitimacy, President obama allows his Black skin to obscure his implicit sanctioning of sociopolitical and sociolegal forms of white supremacy. Immanent atheism “clears a space” for people to see things differently, to acknowledge that even state leaders who share our skin tone and cultural formation can be the largest proponents for our mattering negatively.24 **The deconstructive step of immanent atheism leads to an apprehension of the state for what it is: a racist god.** This, in turn, makes a way for the second movement of immanent atheism, iconoclasm. In so doing, it exposes the question of Black lives mattering as a religious question for, as Charles Long indicated above, **the myths and narratives of American exceptionalism are made possible only through the negative mattering of Black people.** Thus, the iconoclasm of immanent atheism pushes for a destruction of idols, of symbols, iconography, narratives, and practices that support the state, those that authorize its self-representational and self-legitimating accounts and thus conceal its violence and imperialism in the language of sanctity, destiny, and the heroic. This language of concealment is, by and large, religious: **America is framed as chosen, as a “city on a hill,” but this narrative is made possible only through the systematic exploitation of people of color, particularly Black people.** Immanent atheism pushes for a destruction of this religious logic through the tearing down of icons and idols.25 Given that America is able to operate in bad faith and is able to perpetuate a narrative of innocence, equality, and fundamental fairness contrary to its history, **the immanent atheist asserts that African Americans and Africana communities worldwide must reject these narratives** (that is, the founding of America by Columbus or the framing of any country as an Edenic utopia) **and the culture** (for example, literature, art, songs, and anthems that glorify war and genocide in the name of nation) **that reinforces, reproduces, and maintains them**. Practically, iconoclasm pushes against these narratives and cultural formations by critiquing and criticizing any disposition that claims property (like a pharmacy or nursing home) is more important than Black life, by refuting the politics of respectability reinforcing assimilationist dispositions (such as the idea that more stringent accountability practices such as the wearing of body cameras will produce different results), and by affirming that the current system must be razed in order for a new mode of social being to be collectively developed and maintained. With Mike Brown’s stepfather, **the immanent atheist affirms the possible necessity of “burning things down”—that is, calling for the destruction of certain structures that are dangerous to Black life—in order to affirm Black life.** Immanent atheism is (or needs to become) a counterculture that is iconoclastic and, therefore, “sensitive to the reality of historical experience.”26 That is to say, it apprehends reality for what it is and, as a result, can dispense with any American cultural idea or activity that supports state violence. This is, in a limited sense, what Edward Said attends to in his Culture and Imperialism, for imperial culture is a mechanism of the state that supports the work of domination, although Said is careful to note that all cultures are involved with one another and neither easily nor always rightfully disentangled, since they tend to be hybrid.27 He is talking about the ways that the counterculture (our term) of those who have been subjugated and colonized functions politically to dislodge colonial narratives. We often miss the political aspect of culture and, instead, focus primarily on the pleasurable and aesthetic features. But the political aspects of counterculture entail an elevation of subjugated communities—in this case Africana ones—that allows them to apprehend how colonial narratives and aesthetics valorize and reinforce the language and grammar of their subjugation. We need to be able to destroy these narratives, in part, by being able to see them for what they are—romantic yet untrue aesthetics that operate in service of white and state-sanctioned domination and violence. **We must destroy these idols and icons** (via the development of a counterculture made possible through deconstruction) **by becoming more critical of state-sanctioned political processes like voting and state-sanctioned structures like militarized police departments**. In so doing, **we create the possibility of destroying the state-gods that continue to make our lives matter negatively.** The state-as-god is a white racist, and the negative mattering of Black life sustains the mythical and theological structures maintaining the state’s theological legitimacy. Therefore, immanent atheism is the quintessential religious response of Africana communities to state-sanctioned violence against them. Such a posture requires deconstructive and iconoclastic responses if Black lives are to matter positively**. Anything short of this is an exercise in futility because the state positions itself as all-powerful and autonomous**, owing nothing to any powers other than its own, though it ostensibly appeals to and uses the language of transcendence that imbues it with a sense of awe, eternality, and immutability (the fact that the Constitution remains unchanged speaks to this). Indeed, the cultural, the political, and the religious are intertwined within the state, and the state generates and inculcates affective dispositions in those it subjugates that serve to engender allegiance and deference to its omnipotence. Immanent atheism demands that people, to whatever extent is possible, reject a state that functions as god and destroys and curtails Black life. **It is atheist in that it rejects any god that disallows the possibility of Black people thriving, and it is religious in that it is centered on the meaning and flourishing of Blackness in an anti-Black world that is its negation.**

#### Atheism is the only path forward; the white racist God sustains his power through the continued reinvestments into the promises of salvation and divine unity. Taking up the project of killing the white God solves the recreation of divine racism that continues to lock Black life into the position of abjection.

**Brown 08** [Carolyn R. Brown, “Is God a White Racist?”, <https://huumanists.org/sites/huumanists.org/files/articles/Is%20God%20a%20White%20Racist%20-%20Brown_0.pdf>, JMH]

The Rev. Dr. William R. Jones is rarely the first name to come to mind when we speak of theologians. Most people think of Karl Barth or Paul Tillich. Unitarian Universalists may know of Henry Nelson Wieman, but few know of Jones, who is the author of a book by the same title as this article. Jones graduated from Howard University, went on to receive his Master of Divinity degree at Harvard, and his PhD in Religious Studies at Brown University. Ordained as a UU minister in June, 1958, he served as an assistant minister for several years before his long academic career at Florida State University. I had the opportunity to talk to Dr. Jones at a graduation service for Starr King School for the Ministry in Berkeley, California. His writing is rigorous, analytical, systematic theology leading to liberation with a religious humanist leaning. His 1973 book examines the work of five leading black theologians, all allegedly working on a theology of black liberation. Jones felt that they could not talk about liberation without dealing with his question: **Is God a white racist?** In fact, he asserts, “black theology is incompatible with liberation theology.” 1 Theology must look at the cause of evil and suffering (theodicy) before it can deal with the hope for liberation, and Jones ends his book with a discussion that moves towards a “Black Theodicy for Today.” 2 Jones argues that theodicy is the central category we must consider as we try to answer the question, Is God A White Racist? He writes: “’divine racism’ surfaces whenever a specific type of suffering, which I identify as ethnic suffering, is joined with particular interpretations of God’s sovereignty over human history and His activity within human history or both.”3 “Ethnic suffering” features mal-distribution, negative quality, enormity and non-catastrophic character, that is, it is spread over centuries. It is not equally suffered by the entire human race, but is concentrated in a particular ethnic group. Ethnic suffering has no essential value for man’s salvation or well being and leads away from one’s highest good.4 Under the traditional theology of Christianity, the cause of suffering is usually quite clearly part of the plan for us. “Theodicy is more than the attempt to exonerate and justify God’s purpose and works in the face of contrary evidence. There is another dimension; for instance, a concern to determine the cause of suffering. In fact every apologetic approach to human suffering is at the same time an implicit conclusion about the cause or origin of suffering.”5 No apology, no theodicy can escape this conclusion. Black theology promotes a concept of God as omni-benevolent, One who cares for us and will reward us in heaven, which is the teaching of the Baptist church where Jones grew up and later entered the ministry. The theology he affirmed as a young Baptist minister, which he now calls “Whiteanity,” preached “the harder the cross, the brighter the crown.”6 **It makes no sense to expect that a benevolent God will give extra rewards to those he causes to suffer more than others**. “To talk about the saving work of God is to presuppose a conclusion about the benevolence of God; it is to assert the essential goodness of God in spite of the prior “evil” that makes his “saving” work necessary. In sum, **salvation is meaningless without the prior affirmation of God’s benevolence toward man.”7** In place of the traditional views of God’s benevolence, Jones offers a humanocentric theism and “secular” humanism. “The essential feature of both is the advocacy of the functional ultimacy of man. Man must act as if he were the ultimate valuator or the ultimate agent in human history or both. **Thus God’s responsibility for the crimes and errors of human history is reduced if not effectively eliminated.”8** The argument Jones makes is important, for many churches today are still preaching that this life is the “cross” we must bear and that we will wear a “brighter crown” in the hereafter. The question is whether this idea of evil and suffering is an impediment in the lives of those who accept it as part of their faith. Jones’ book was largely shunned by his fellow black theologians. **His frustration at that time was that he shared the same goals of all his colleagues, “finding an effective way for black America to affirm its humanity in an environment of racial oppression.**”9 Jones believes that the black church and black Christianity are a form of “mis-religion”10 that fulfills a vital role in keeping blacks oppressed. He challenges as flawed the twin claims that “though blacks accepted the white man’s religion, “they recreated and remolded it to fit their ‘own peculiar needs,’ and that “the black man’s pilgrimage in America was made less onerous because of his religion.”11 He writes of his struggle with the “eleventh commandment: ”Thou shalt not ignore the basic tenets of Judeo-Christian faith. To do so would be merely to establish a folk religion that would not survive the test of history… and the black man will have lost the God who brought him over so many difficult places in the past.”12 Considering statements such as these and looking at the reality of history, he grew increasingly suspicious of the culpability of the black church and black theology in keeping oppression alive. Jones asks: “On what grounds can the black theologian affirm that God’s activity will be different in the future—i.e., effecting the liberation of blacks—when the present and past history of blacks is oppression?”13 If one keeps the traditional concept of a liberating God, one must ask these questions: **Why does the evil and concomitant suffering of blacks continue? What kind of liberation is this?** To avoid the contradiction, he urges black theologians to consider humanocentric theism as the solution. Since black religion is fundamentally theistic, there must remain some reference to this foundational concept. What must change is the idea that God is responsible for human history. Only in this way can the charge of divine racism be avoided. Traditional or “theocentric theism would argue for God’s controlling and overruling sovereignty over the essential aspects of the human situation, especially human destiny.”14 Humanocentric theism assigns an exalted status to man, particularly to human freedom, which Jones writes “conforms to God’s ultimate purpose and plan for mankind.”15 He cites the writings of Martin Buber, which point to our “codetermining power” 16 by virtue of our creation. Being a codetermining power is intrinsic to our being. This points up the necessity for the activity and choice if we are going to reach our full potentials. The writings of Harvey Cox in Secular City also support humanocentric theism. Cox contends that we are in command of nature, and it is certainly true that we have the power to destroy, whether we can do otherwise remains to be seen. Politics depend upon our power, and we are responsible for human values. We are the ultimate power relative to values and history. Cox asks the question: Is God simply another way of talking about man? Another question could be in what sense, if any, does God retain a veto power over man?17 Humanocentric theism is the proposal that humans are co-creators of the essential features of our existence, which depend upon our activity, choice, and freedom, in concert with a reinterpretation of divine sovereignty and omnipotence that allow for this. A sort of hands off divinity who served only as the efficient cause or originator of all. This complex of ideas is so closely related to religious humanism that one can find few differences besides some key words that admit to an acceptance of some starting point for the universe. In the later edition of his book (1998) Jones corrects his position to that of a religious humanist. We can understand what a drastic step acknowledging this theological position would present to traditional churches. It’s even a difficult step for some Unitarian Universalists to take. Humanocentric theism “provides a consistent framework for accommodating the freedom of [humanity], an indispensable ingredient of a theology of liberation.”18 It traces the cause of racism to human forces. **It removes a theological and moral escape often used by the white oppressor**. “He can no longer point to anything but [humans] as the sustaining force behind racism.”19 The implications of this are far reaching in that they put the responsibility on both blacks and whites to recognize our potential to create freedom and transform power, which might actually end oppression. Humanocentric theism could become an effective remedy for quietism, the attitude of accepting evil and suffering in hopes of a better life after death. “The oppressed, in part, are oppressed precisely because they buy, or are indoctrinated to accept, a set of beliefs that negate those attitudes and actions necessary for liberation. Accordingly, the purpose and first step of a theology of liberation is to effect a radical conversion of the mind of the oppressed, to free his/her mind from those destructive and enslaving beliefs that stifle the movement toward liberation.”20 Both secular and religious humanists agree that “the actual character of human history is the product of human choices and actions. Human progress or moral improvement is not assured, particularly where black prospects are at stake. Black hope may run afoul of the changing and adapting forms of racism in the future.”21 Jones states that “the cherished beliefs of black people are in fact part and parcel of their oppression!”22 Humanocentric theism, secular or religious humanism all face the same challenge. They agree that history is the result of human actions, even for those who still believe there is a God out there. Process theology and the rational empiricists tell us that good only happens if we do it. Jones’ book makes clear to me at least, that the traditional concept of a sovereign, benevolent God must include divine racism. **God is a white racist**. Such statements can also be made regarding the centuries of suffering of the Jewish people. We cannot convince those who choose to continue to survive under a theocentric theism that they are missing something. Lerone Bennet’s challenge to black religion is “to think with our eyes… to abandon the partial frame of reference of our oppressor and to create… concepts that release our reality.”23 If we have codetermining power, and I believe we do, in fact I believe that only by human actions will anything come to fruition in human history; we are responsible for continuing the work our Association has been doing for the past fifty years. We are called to be worldchangers. We are called to end oppression. We are called to work against those who would limit the possibilities available for all people. We are called to be the power that embraces liberation rather than mere survival for all people.

### 1NC- Case

#### Vote neg on presumption---inherency double bind---either the plan SHOULD HAVE HAPPENED during the pandemic when states were literally hiring nurses from other states, bringing nurses out of retirement, and lowering hiring standards, OR the policies of 32 states that are blocking the aff now are insurmountable even in crisis times---they have not read evidence that the plan DOES cause state compliance with the standards by the aff which means that even if fiat solves IN THE ABSTRACT, they have zero evidence that connects the state action doctrine to increasing nurse practitioners

#### Reject their articulation of the status quo as an “untouched market”---parento only articulates why choice in healthcare doesn’t exist---nothing about NPs changes the fundamental structure of healthcare---

#### The plan is a rhetorical ploy to whitewash the structural conditions that send African Americans to an early grave, the plan is a palliative not worth taking

Grossfeld ‘17 - contributor to American Prospect magazine [Jim, "It will take more than single-payer to make Baltimore healthy," Nov 20, prospect.org/article/it-will-take-more-single-payer-make-baltimore-healthy]

See that over there?” I pull over to the curb and Glenn Ross points to a half-acre patch of weeds and tall grass wedged between a railroad bridge and a new East Baltimore elementary school, the first to be built in the neighborhood in more than 30 years.

“You’ve got the playground there and over there’s a brownfield”—the term for the sites where factories, refineries, and other businesses closed after poisoning the land and water beneath them.

“Trains used to leave coal there,” Ross says. “Then a truck repair shop opened up. The ground there is hard and black with oil. Why would you ever build a school next to a contaminated site?”

A burly Vietnam vet and one of Baltimore’s most seasoned activists, Ross has been on the front lines of dozens of the battles facing the city’s African American community, which today makes up two-thirds of Baltimore’s 620,000 residents. Now his priority is cleaning up the brownfields and dumps that pockmark the city’s black neighborhoods, exposing the families living in them to a laundry list of toxins that have been linked to cancer and other diseases.

On the drive back to his house, we pass some of the city’s 17,000 boarded-up houses, a storefront with whitewashed windows that was once the neighborhood’s supermarket, and a building peppered with bullet holes—no particular reason why, just a calling card left by one of the city’s drug gangs.

Images like these have long made Baltimore a poster child for the urban poverty that results from institutional racism—even more so after the April 2015 death of Freddie Gray and the protests that followed. By the latest estimates, more than 28 percent of African Americans in the city live below the poverty line. The poverty rate for Baltimore households headed by women—the vast majority of whom are African American—is far higher, 41 percent.

These numbers provide as much insight into the health crisis facing African American neighborhoods as MRIs or CT scans of the individuals living within them. Maybe more. Because poverty—and the racism that gave rise to it—is the overarching reason why the life expectancy in 14 of Baltimore’s predominantly African American neighborhoods is now lower than North Korea’s.

One of those neighborhoods is the one where Glenn Ross lives, Madison/Eastend, which is 90 percent African American and where the average life expectancy is not quite 69 years. Life expectancy in the nearby Baltimore neighborhood of Medfield/Hampden/Woodberry/Remington, which is 78 percent white, is 76.5 years.

The reasons for this disparity aren’t hard to find. Compared with Medfield/Hampden/Woodberry/Remington, Ross’s neighborhood of Madison/Eastend has a homicide rate nearly 12 times higher, a cancer mortality rate 66 percent higher, and an AIDS mortality rate more than 12 times higher.

The term used to describe the factors that are responsible for such disparities is “determinants of health.” Some are the ones Ross talked about: toxins, housing, access to food, violence, and drugs. But there are others, too: education, unemployment, the number and quality of neighborhood parks, the rat population, and anything else that impacts the health of the community as a whole. And, of course, there’s the availability of health insurance and access to care. The most important of all, right? Well, no. It’s complicated.

“THERE'S A DIFFERENCE between health care, which is critically important, and the array of social, economic, and environmental determinants of health,” says Dr. Brian Smedley, co-founder and executive director of the National Collaborative for Health Equity. “In fact, the health of populations is only minimally affected by health care. Some estimates are that only 20 percent [of a population’s health] can be explained by access and the quality of care.”

The Baltimore City Health Department (BCHD) estimate is less generous. In its report “Healthy Baltimore 2020: A Blueprint for Health,” BCHD points out that although 97 percent of health-care dollars are spent on the health-care system, only 10 percent of what determines life expectancy actually happens “within the four walls of a clinic.” The other 90 percent is decided upstream, where people live, work, go to school, and spend their free time.

All of this says something about having a single-payer or a Medicare-for-all system (slogans aside, they’re really not the same thing). It’s that while either would be a vast improvement over the insurance system we have now, neither would have a profound impact on the health crisis facing African Americans.

Some who “argue that we need to expand access to health insurance tend to also believe that if we achieve universal coverage, then racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic health care and status gaps will close,” Smedley says. “That’s simply not the case.”

What’s sending black people in Baltimore to an early grave isn’t that America lacks a Canadian-style health-care system. It’s the legacy of Jim Crow.

“BLACKS SHOULD BE quarantined in isolated slums in order to reduce the incidence of civil disturbance, to prevent the spread of communicable disease into the nearby White neighborhoods, and to protect property values among the White majority.” They could be words in South Africa’s Pass Laws, but they come from the text of a 1911 Baltimore city ordinance.

The ordinance was eventually overturned, but for all the difference that made, it may as well have stayed on the books. Baltimore whites had long believed segregation was fundamental to protecting themselves from the crime, “loose morals,” and illness that were presumably endemic to African Americans. City ordinance or not, Baltimore lenders, mortgage bankers, and real-estate interests conspired in plain view to keep black families from moving into white neighborhoods.

There was never any ambiguity about whether African Americans could get loans to buy houses in the city’s white neighborhoods, or any doubt that anyone who attempted to sell or rent to blacks would be penalized for it. In 1934, Baltimore’s homegrown segregationists gained a powerful new ally with the creation of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), one of the crown jewels of the New Deal, which, as a matter of policy, denied mortgage insurance to black people. The feds also established the practice of redlining, literally marking off African American neighborhoods on maps and designating those who lived within them, regardless of their income, as credit risks. At the same time, the FHA was backing loans for whites—essentially underwriting their exodus from the city.

In his 2009 book, Infectious Fear: Politics, Disease, and the Health Effects of Segregation, Samuel Kelton Roberts Jr., director of Columbia University’s Institute for Research in African American Studies, provides a chilling account of how housing discrimination hastened the spread of tuberculosis in Baltimore’s African American community beginning in the early 1900s.

Roberts points out that even though African Americans made up one-fifth of Baltimore’s population, they lived on only 2 percent of its residential property and often paid rents that averaged three times higher than what whites paid for similar homes. How could they afford it? Most couldn’t. Given the poverty wages earned by most black workers, the only way many could make the rent was to take in tenants of their own. For their part, landlords had little compunction about failing to provide even rudimentary maintenance, leaving homes damp, stifling, and reeking of decay and rot. City officials provided only mediocre public services, if any. The impact on black families was devastating. In his book Not in My Neighborhood: How Bigotry Shaped a Great American City, longtime Baltimore journalist Antero Pietila points out that when Baltimore’s citywide TB rate climbed to 132 cases per 100,000 people, in one black neighborhood it had surged to 958 cases per 100,000 people. The sight of fatigued black men, women, and children suffering from chills, fever, and coughing up blood or sputum wasn’t uncommon.

While redlining didn’t create TB, it was responsible for its phenomenal spread in Baltimore’s African American community, and the illness and death that followed. A century later, redlining continues to determine the health of the city’s black neighborhoods.

Today, according to a survey by the Corporation for Enterprise Development (CFED, known today as Prosperity Now), 32 percent of black Baltimore households have no household net worth at all, and 67 percent have so meager a level of liquid savings that they could meet their basic expenses for no more than three months if they had a medical emergency or suffered a job loss.

The Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) and CFED report that if current trends continue, the average black household in the United States will need 228 years to accumulate as much wealth as their white counterparts have now. Wealth inequality, rooted in segregation, has made poverty an enduring fact of life in Baltimore. It’s the common thread to the social determinants that are robbing African Americans of their health.

WHEN CNN COVERS the health impact of the criminal justice system on the African American community, it usually begins and ends with an account of the police killing a black person. If there’s video, all the better. But police violence is a piece of a much bigger story: how the justice system undermines the health of the entire African American community.

Ralikh Hayes has been an organizer since his teens in campaigns to change the city’s criminal justice system. Ask him about the health of Black Baltimoreans and he’ll tell you that the issue he’s concerned with isn’t whether something he’s exposed to now will kill him in 20 years. It’s simply not getting shot.

“It’s a public health issue that young black people don’t think they’re going to make it to 21, 23, 25. The fact that I turned 23 is considered a milestone in the community,” he says. “People don’t think their life expectancy is that long.”

The experience of violence and degradation in black America, of course, has all too commonly come under the color of law. Police violence and abuse are a fundamental cause of the stress and trauma suffered by black people. Two-thirds of young African Americans say that they or someone they know has experienced violence or harassment at the hands of the police, according to a 2016 GenForward poll. Thirty percent of black men say they experienced it themselves. And hearing, reading, or seeing news coverage of police violence and harassment of black people can activate what psychologists call “racial trauma,” triggering memories of police harassment and other instances of racism that they and the people they know have experienced. Almost one in ten black Americans suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD.

“I'D GO THERE IF I had an accident, but not if I had a choice,” he says. “He” is a retired Baltimore steelworker who’s shy about being quoted by name. “There” is Baltimore’s Johns Hopkins Hospital. Together with the Mayo Clinic and the Cleveland Clinic, Hopkins is part of the trinity of top-ranked U.S. hospitals—a latter-day Lourdes to which sick people from around the world beat a path, hoping to find cures they’ll find nowhere else. But in Baltimore’s African American community, the hospital has a different reputation.

“They treat black people with disrespect,” he adds. “Whites get much better care.”

It’s a view shared by many African Americans. Many grew up having heard the story that if they played too close to Hopkins they might get snatched off the street for medical experiments. In their 2013 book Lead Wars, historians David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz revealed that as late as the 1990s researchers affiliated with Hopkins conducted a study that exposed children, most of them African American, to dangerously high amounts of lead.

One institution better able to address some health determinants than a hospital is the community health center. Today, there are 9,800 such centers (their number augmented over the past decade by the $11 billion included in the Affordable Care Act for that purpose), which provide care to 24 million low-income Americans, two-thirds of them minority. Because they’re small, located near their patients, culturally compatible, and often work with community leaders to address some of their patients’ non-clinical problems—access to healthy food, for example—they fill needs that most hospitals either don’t or can’t.

To what extent, though, does racism still affect the medical system at large? In 2015, The Journal of the American Medical Association Pediatrics reported on the findings of a study led by Dr. Monika Goyal of Children’s National Health System and Dr. Nathan Kuppermann and Sean Cleary of George Washington University. They found that “[b]lack children are less likely [than white children] to receive any pain medication for moderate pain and less likely to receive opioids for severe pain, suggesting a different threshold for treatment.”

An older study—but one that nonetheless came 36 years after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act—was published in 2000 in Social Science and Medicine. In it, Michelle van Ryn of the Mayo Clinic and Jane Burke of the University of Illinois at Chicago College of Medicine examined 842 post-angiogram encounters between physicians and their patients. They found that “lower [socioeconomic status] African Americans consulting a cardiologist are more likely than affluent Whites to be perceived as: lacking intelligence; lacking self-control; irrational; unlikely to have significant career demands; at risk for inadequate social support; unlikely to desire a physically active lifestyle; at risk for substance abuse; and likely to be noncompliant with cardiac rehabilitation.”

One change that would likely have a positive impact on the quality of health care provided to African Americans would be an increase in the number of black doctors. It’s not only a matter of African Americans feeling more comfortable having a black doctor; it’s that African American doctors may be more willing to see low-income—disproportionately minority—patients. In a 2015 New England Journal of Medicine article, Dr. David Ansell and Dr. Edwin McDonald wrote, “Black medical students are more than twice as likely as white students to express a desire to care for underserved communities of color. Our inability to recruit black men into medicine is alarming, given the urgency of racial health care disparities in the United States.”

By some measures, only about 5 percent of practicing physicians are black, and there’s little evidence that number is going to grow. In 2004, medical school enrollment for African American students was 7.4 percent, but by 2011 it dropped to 7 percent.

The reasons why have been talked over (and over) for years: Throughout K–12, schools aren’t identifying and encouraging African American students who may have an interest in medicine; schools attended by black children don’t have the same resources to teach science that predominantly white schools do; the shortage of black physicians means there are few role models; many black college graduates are unprepared to apply to medical school; and, of course, black students and their families can’t afford the staggering price of studying medicine.

For generations, historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) like Howard University in Washington, D.C., and Meharry Medical College in Nashville trained the lion’s share of America’s black physicians. They’ve also struggled to survive financially. Now, with Donald Trump suggesting that federal support for them may be unconstitutional, HBCUs could be facing their toughest times ever.

One group working to counteract these trends is White Coats 4 Black Lives, or WC4BL, a national organization of medical students whose mission is “to eliminate racial bias in the practice of medicine and recognize racism as a threat to the health and well-being of people of color.” With 54 active chapters at medical schools across the nation, WC4BL says its primary goal, in the spirit of Black Lives Matter, is to put medicine’s racial disparities on the front burner.

Indeed, Black Lives Matter may be providing a template for dealing with all the systemic issues that threaten and thwart black lives. Earlier this year, Mustafa Santiago Ali, a former EPA senior advisor for environmental justice and community revitalization, became the senior vice president of climate, environmental justice and community revitalization at the Hip Hop Caucus. He sees a coming-together of discrete movements to improve African Americans’ lives. “The environmental justice side, the public health side, and Black Lives Matter, all these various organizations are engaged in Flint [Michigan] and understand that what’s happening there and other communities is a sign of the disinvestment that’s been happening there for decades—even longer than decades,” he says.

“There’s the Band-Aid approach, which has its relevancy, which is just focusing on the pipes and the water,” he says. “And then there’s the broader construct of making sure there’s green housing, making sure that transportation routes are beneficial to the community, utilizing job training programs, creating small anchor institutions.”

And health insurance? While it’s important, it’s no substitute for creating new clinics that provide easy access to care. Pointing to the success of community health centers that today meet the needs of more than 24 million patients in poor communities, Ali says, “We could turn brownfields into health fields by cleaning up contaminated sites and placing health-care facilities there.”

SINCE IT HAD TAKEN a couple of weeks to arrange the interview, I was thrilled to finally have him on the phone. He was one of the country’s strongest advocates for single-payer—he wished to remain anonymous—but what I wanted to talk about with him that afternoon was racial health disparities. The responses I got from him didn’t say as much about the implications of, say, food deserts or the shortage of African American doctors as they did about the current politics of much of the left. The answer to all of my questions was single-payer.

It took a lot of prodding but eventually he explained why.

“The conversation always has to be broader than [racial] disparities,” he said. “When you look at America’s will to end poverty, it was highest during the Great Depression, when the images of most poor people were white.”

Despite the fact that the health crisis facing African Americans has less to do with access to insurance than with those other social determinants, the idea that health is rationed not only by class but by race hasn’t commonly been part of the current argument for universal coverage. That’s partly the result of political calculation. Talking about black people suffering poor health more and dying sooner isn’t likely the most persuasive argument for many white voters. When Republicans sought to repeal the Affordable Care Act, one reason they failed is that Medicaid had acquired so many white recipients (by virtue of both the ACA’s raising the income eligibility threshold and the downward mobility of the white working class) that it had become impossible for Republicans to get away with deriding it as a giveaway to blacks.

#### The politics of “care”, whether institutional or individual, are coopted by the state not to reduce harm, but increase it---their moral calls for helping others only mask the articulation of blackness as a threat to the smooth functioning of a white supremacist government

Sharron, 19 - Kelly Christina Sharron, Doctorate in Philosophy from the University of Arizona, 2019(“THE CARING STATE: THE POLITICS OF CONTRADICTION IN FERGUSON, MISSOURI,” Proquest Dissertations Library, bam)

Introduction: The Politics of Care: Feminism, Feminist Theory, and the State

This dissertation emerged out of an ongoing interest in state power, particularly as it relates to the carceral state. The conversation and events that overwhelmed these topics, for me, have been police violence. The shooting of Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager, by white officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri became a national story, and framed what would become ongoing attention to police brutality. Moreover, the degree to which the police force and National Guard responded with military equipment, weapons, tanks, and riot gear sparked debate about what role police forces play in communities, if they have overstepped their authority, and the legitimacy of protest. While these are all important and worthy contributions, what seemed more troubling was the way that people readily accepted the solutions offered by the state. These solutions, and the rhetoric surrounding them, are what I have framed as “care.” They included things like community policing, accountability, and soft reforms like body cameras. As more unarmed people of color were killed by the police, it became immediately clear that the solutions offered were not enough to upend the problem, policing itself.

One of the most popular images to circulate after the Ferguson grand jury decision is one of a young black boy in an embrace with a white cop during a protest taking place in Portland, Oregon. This photo was shared over 400,000 times on Facebook, and marked a desire for reconciliation without meaningful change. The police officer appears to be comforting the boy, who is sobbing; it marks a tender moment between two differently affected groups, as though this could have been Wilson and Brown under different circumstances, if only they would have exhibited more care. In telling the story behind the photo, the pictured police Sgt. Bret Barnum approached the boy, Devonte Hart, who was holding a “free hugs” sign, “not as a police officer but just as a human being” (Grinberg 2014). Barnum continued, “it really solidified what all of us do this work for – this job for – to create good will” (Grinberg 2014). This isn’t the only “feel good” photo to circulate, there were other hugs, high fives, sharing food, etc. that all indicated this sense of peace and racial harmony. This sentimental moment between officer and person of color demonstrates a will and desire to care. These moments of sentimentality, as embodied in the state, are at the center of this dissertation. They foster the feeling that policing could be about good will, and that the state doesn’t necessarily intend to commit harm.

It is not just that the caring solutions and rhetoric offered by the state were ineffectual. These responses actually produce more harm. What on face appears to be contradictory aims and effects of state power, violence and care, are actually integral to each other. The reforms and sympathetic rhetoric offered by the state do not contribute to less policing, but rather extend policing. Rather than take on the serious critiques of policing, these reforms are offered as a way to harmoniously and surreptitiously continue and exacerbate the violent effects of policing. As it became clear in the years that followed, reforms failed to substantially affect police brutality, and in fact helped to short circuit some of the critiques about policing, all the while making the state appear kinder and gentler.

This dissertation investigates this range of political effects, from the violence and militarization to the use and popularization of care as a technique of re-legitimization and extension of state power. Brown’s death was not the first killing of an unarmed black person by a white officer to rise to public attention, but it did garner a particular resonance among activists, political officials, and the media. This dissertation takes stake in two particular moments: the death of Brown and the grand jury’s decision to not indict Wilson. These moments sparked larger questions about the function of the criminal justice system and who is afforded legal protections. The criticism of the grand jury decision and Ferguson policing practices culminated in a Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation that found racial injustices and disproportionately distributed revenueraising practices. In looking to care as a state technique, this dissertation examines media, state, and activist discourses surrounding the death of Brown, as well as the historical and political context of St. Louis. Using a cultural studies framework, I examine these discourses and archives asking: What are the particularities of Ferguson that catalyzed such a response? What is the context in which racist policing practices emerge? How does the political system admit injustice while also maintaining the fiction of colorblind democracy? This dissertation reveals the nuances and contradictions of state practice with respect to history, space, militarization, and justice. Finally, I consider the practices of social movements and the possibilities of incorporating care into more revolutionary frameworks amidst state-based care.

I situate my discussion of the shooting of Michael Brown in four fields of study: feminist theory, state theory, cultural studies, and political geography. I deploy feminist theory to understand how difference is made meaningful and contributes to disparate life outcomes; state theory to contextualize this iteration of statecraft with regard to care and violence; cultural studies to read and interpret language, discourse, and texts that are made meaningful through power; and political geography to discuss the impact of processes of spatialization and differentiation on policing practices. As I argue, in the contemporary U.S. landscape, state power relies on violence alongside inclusion, sympathy, and recourse. While Brown was shot in an act of violence, and the Grand Jury resulted in a legal violence, the subsequent responses of the Attorney General, President Obama, and the Department of Justice illustrate the ways in which the violence of the state is reoriented into rhetoric of justice, sympathy, and impending equality. Both violence and the more insidious operations of power are necessary to the functions of the state.

Brown’s death has a continued resonance in the ongoing attention to police violence, yet it was not the first, last, or most extraordinary. While Ferguson lies at the heart of this dissertation, I explore the political, social, and cultural milieu in which Ferguson is situated and articulated. Amidst a background of ongoing police militarization, dominant frameworks seek to maintain that blackness, as a constellation of ideas projected on and embodied in particular people, is the threat to American peace and justice rather than the extra-/illegal actions of the police. This dissertation seeks not only to unravel this claim, and demonstrate the racist ideologies that guide police action under even its most benevolent forms, but also to demonstrate the racist, gendered, sexualized, and classed underpinnings of the most idyllic of terms and aspirations from the state, and the ways in which these contradictions are actually critical to its function. The events in Ferguson exceed the geographic and political stakes of the event itself. Ferguson is instructive to the larger context of police and state power. Brown’s death is not an isolated instance, and protest and social movements do not respond to Brown alone. Rather, Brown’s death points to the larger milieu of racist policing practices—past, present, and future—taking place in Ferguson and across the United States over generations. Stuart Hall et. al's Policing the Crisis (1978; 2013) provides a framework and model to think about the significance of a singular event (in their case, the Handsworth mugging) and its relationship to the social milieu. Of their method, they say: Our concern was to use such a starting point – concrete events, practices, relationships and cultures – to approach the 'structural configurations that cannot be reduced to the interactions and practices through which they express themselves'... we sought to emulate the ethnographic imagination but also to move beyond the focus on the here and now of everyday 'interactions and practices' by locating them in the histories taking place behind all our backs (Hall et al. 1978; 2013, xi).

The text shuttles between the historical context, the Handsworth mugging, the symbol of the mugger, the state, the media, and the structuring logics of law and order. I follow the method put forth in Policing the Crisis to describe the events in Ferguson, but also their larger histories, contexts, representations, and effects. I also describe the expressions of care and their contextualization amidst violent rhetoric and effects.

Care

Sara Ahmed opens The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2015) with a question: “How does a nation come to be imagines as having a ‘soft touch’? How does this ‘having’ become a form of ‘being’, or a national attribute?” (Ahmed 2015, 1). Deeply personal, and personalized, attributes like emotions, feelings, and orientations, take on a national form, and are narrated as traits of the nation. Taking Ahmed’s description of national emotions as a starting point, I explore these questions throughout: How are emotions imagined to be part of collective bodies and institutions? What are the implications of imagining care as an institutional activity or affective orientation? What does it mean to make the police care?

In The Care of the Self (1986) Michel Foucault talks about care as pertaining to the body and the soul, as a means to cultivate and perfect oneself. Foucault describes the evolution of care:

It took the form of an attitude, a mode of behavior; it became instilled in ways of living; it evolved into procedures, practices, and formulas that people reflected on, developed, perfected, and taught. It thus came to constitute a social practice, giving rise to relationships between individuals, to exchanges and communications, and at times even to institutions. And it gave rise, finally, to a certain mode of knowledge and to the elaboration of a science” (Foucault 1986, 45).

Foucault describes a shift in care from the self to more general realms like medicine, knowledge, and institutions. Care is an orientation toward the self, as well as to objects. Foucault provides the scaffolding to think of care as extending beyond the self, or relations between people, and to thinking about the state and police as institutions of care, or as institutions involved in caring relations. In other words, the state has the capacity to care, to invoke care, for its citizens.

The meaning of care includes many dimensions including care for the self, care for others, and institutionalized care. Care most often describes a relational, ethical orientation, which eschews individualism in favor of communitarian ethics (See Engster 2005; Thomas 1993). These discussions and various viewpoints on care are related to the central terms discussed by Ahmed and Foucault, namely the integration of care into institutions and the projection of care, feelings, and emotions onto national bodies. I briefly consider care and caring, particularly as they have been developed in feminist ethics and theory, as feminine, ethical, interdependent, blurring public and private spheres, and finally when oriented to the state. While the meaning of care and its implications are often debated and discussed, care is generally portrayed as a panacea to political problems with very little consideration of what some potential pitfalls of care, or how care could be mobilized in malevolent ways.

#### The public health system constantly views Black bodies as objects for the advancement of medicine for non-Black people insofar as antiblackness is required to spur innovation.

**Wallace 20**—Alicia A. Wallace [a queer Black feminist, women’s human rights defender, and writer. She’s passionate about social justice and community building] and reviewed by Angela M. Bell, MD, FACP [a double board certified in internal medicine and sports medicine and practices on the south side of Chicago], “Race and Medicine: How Modern Medicine Has Been Fueled By Racism,” *Healthline,* 16 Oct. 2020, <https://www.healthline.com/health/modern-medicine-fueled-by-racism>. ND

Medical advances save lives and improve quality of life, but many of them have come at a high cost. There’s a dark side to medical advances — one that includes the literal use of Black people. This dark history has reduced Black people to test subjects: bodies void of humanity**. Not only has racism fueled many modern medical advances, it continues to play a role in preventing Black people from seeking and receiving appropriate medical attention.** Painful experiments J. Marion Sims, credited for the invention of the vaginal speculum and repair of vesico-vaginal fistula, is referred to as **the “father of gynecology.”** Starting in 1845Trusted Source, Sims **experimented on Black women who were enslaved, performing surgical techniques without the use of anesthesia. The women,** considered the property of enslavers**, were not permitted to give consent. Further, it was believed that Black people did not feel pain, and this myth continues to restrict Black people’s access to proper medical treatment. The names of the Black women we know of who endured torturous experimentation at the hands of Sims are Lucy, Anarcha, and Betsey. They were taken to Sims by enslavers who were focused on increasing their production yields. This included the reproduction of enslaved people. Anarcha was 17 years old and had gone through a difficult 3-day labor and stillbirth.** After 30 surgeries with nothing but opium to ease her pain, Sims perfected his gynecological technique. “Anarcha Speaks: A History in Poems,” a poetry collection by Denver poet Dominique Christina, speaks from the perspectives of both Anarcha and Sims. An etymologist, Christina was researching the origin of “anarchy” and came across Anarcha’s name with an asterisk. Upon further research, Christina found that Anarcha was used in terrible experiments to aid in Sims’ scientific discoveries. While statues honor his legacy, Anarcha is a footnote. Black men as ‘disposable’ **The Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male, commonly referred to as The Tuskegee Syphilis Study, is a fairly well-known experiment conducted by the United States Public Health Service over a 40-year period starting in 1932. It involved about 600 Black men from Alabama who were between ages 25 and 60 and experiencing poverty. The study included 400 Black men with untreated syphilis and around 200 who didn’t have the disease to act as a control group. They were all told they were being treated for “bad blood” for 6 months. The study involved X-rays, blood tests, and painful spinal taps. When participation waned, the researchers started providing transportation and hot meals, exploiting the participants’ lack of resources. In 1947, penicillin was shown to be effective in the treatment of syphilis, but it wasn’t administered to the men in the study. Instead, researchers were studying the progression of syphilis, allowing the men to become ill and die. In addition to not providing treatment, the researchers went to great lengths to ensure that the participants weren’t treated by other parties.** The study was only ended in 1972 when the Associated Press, tipped off by Peter Buxton, reported on it. The tragedy of the Tuskegee study didn’t end there. **Many of the men in the study died from syphilis and related illnesses. The study also affected women and children as the disease spread.**

## Block

### Kritik

#### Blackness is structurally positioned in society as an absolute non-Other in relation to humanity at the levels of phenomenology, mythology, psychology, and spirituality.

More, 21—professor of philosophy at the University of Limpopo (Mabogo, “The Body, Racism, and Contingency,” *Sartre on Contingency: Antiblack Racism and Embodiment*, Chapter 5, 122-130, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

Why then is the black person in an antiblack world the absolute Other or a non-Other? Phenomenological ontology reveals that Otherness is a fundamental category of human thought. In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir asks several critical questions about the being of woman, which led her to study the notion of Otherness and subordination. These critical questions may, mütãt´ĭs mütãn´dĭs, apply to blacks in an antiblack world except that for blacks, Otherness takes on a different form of “not-other.” Echoing Hegel and Sartre, she states: “We find in consciousness itself a fundamental hostility towards every other consciousness; the subject can be posed only in being opposed—he sets himself up as the essential, as opposed to the other, the inessential, the object” (de Beauvoir, 1989: xxiii). She first notes that a man would never write a book on the situation of the human male. Thus, the relation between man and woman is not symmetrical. Male represents both the positive and the neutral aspects of humanity while female stands only for the negative aspects. The male describes himself in his theories as standing for the normal and the ideal while the female is depicted as the deviant. This means that man defines woman as relative to him, in oppositional terms. Thus, her well-known declaration: “He is the Subject, he is the Absolute— she is the Other” (de Beauvoir, 1989: xxii).

The key to the solution lies in Sartre’s ontology of “being-for-Others” or what is commonly called “the problem of other minds.” His model of our relations with other human beings is grounded not on Heidegger’s Mitsein but on Hegel’s master/slave relations. Otherness, for him, arises from the attempt of consciousness to understand itself. In its upsurge, consciousness, by a stroke of internal and external negation, has to be other than another being. Through the negation of not being the Other, I make myself be and the Other arises as the Other. This negation in my relations with the Other constitutes a relation of conflict. Accordingly, my sense of self is constituted not only by my assumptions about who I am, but also by a sense of who or what I am not. In Hegelian fashion, Sartre emphasizes that self-consciousness is possible through the existence of another self-consciousness which reflects it. There can be no self-consciousness or self-knowledge without the presence of an Other who appears as my mirror. This however implies the reverse idea about Otherness, namely: that the image we construct of the Other also emerges out of a particular sense of who we are and who or what we are not. At the origin of every self-image, argues Charmé, “lies an idea of the Other, an ‘Other-image’ that delineates what one’s own self is not” (1991: 5). The models of the self and the Other which we thus create are called “mythic” by Charmé in order to “indicate that the essential qualities by which we define self and other, as well as the boundaries we trace between them, consist of a delicate web of our most primordial assumptions about what is real and of value” (1991: 5). These mythic images include the distorted and hidden images we sometimes create of Others. In this distortion we experience what is Other as either potentially good or evil. In short, we construct a Manichean myth. For the anti-Semite, the embodiment of the Other is the Jew; for the colonizer, it is the native; for the bourgeoisie, it is the proletariat; and of course, for the antiblack consciousness, it is the Negro or black person.

But, as pointed out earlier, it is worth keeping in mind that in an antiblack world, black Otherness—unlike other Othernesses—takes on a different mode of relationality. This constitutes antiblack racism as unique and different from other forms of racisms and oppressions. While the relation between the oppressor and the oppressed, bourgeoisie and proletariat, anti-Semite and Jew, male and female is that of self-Other, that is, shared category of humanness, the relation between white and black is a relation of non-relationality since the non-humanity of the black is the operative category. In such a condition the self-Other relation is eradicated and what remains is the self-not-Other relation. This non-relational relation is given credence through the construction of myths by the antiblack as a flight from the reality of its contingency.

The antiblack consciousness constructs such “myths” in relation to itself and the racial not-Other in an effort to transcend the reality of its contingency. The very creation of myths constitutes itself as contradiction, that is, the very necessity to create myths is itself a recognition and admission of the humanity of the group for whom myths have to be created. The power and importance of myths of whatever kind—racial or otherwise—was recognized by a former rector of the former Rand Afrikaans University (now University of Johannesburg) in South Africa, who later rose in the apartheid regime to become Minister of National Education and finally the vice president of the country, Gerrit Viljoen. He said the following about the racial solidarity of the Afrikaner people in a speech delivered in 1971:

The Volk has the need for myths to help support its ethnic existence. Even in those cases where their content is incongruent with the objective external historical or contemporary reality, they may yet mirror certain internal values and ideals that bind the community together through their acceptance of and faith in it. The point isn’t whether myth is objective, true or fictitious, but whether the community accepts it as a veritable rendering of what they regard as a truthful and authentic value or ideal. (cited in Schutte, 1995: 31)

This is a classic example of bad faith, that is, the attempt to flee a displeasing truth for a pleasing falsehood. By his own admission, Viljoen acknowledges that falsification is necessary in order to achieve the objective of the myth.2 In antiblack mythic imagination, the racist consciousness conceives human beings racially (through the color of the body) different from itself as the absolute non-Other, as antithetical to itself in the order of humanity, in the Great Chain of Being.

As indicated in the early chapters, Sartre conceives of racism in contrast conception of the Other. For him, blacks, women, homosexuals, Jews, and other marginal groups, “represent paradigmatic Others in his culture, i.e. inverted images of the normative archetypes of white, male, heterosexual, Christian culture” (Charmé, 1991a: 253). In his work on anti-Semitism, he characterizes the Jew as a contrast conception whom the anti-Semite needs. The presence of the Jew is an imperative necessity for the anti-Semite. “To whom else could he be superior? Better still, it is in opposition to the Jew, and the Jew alone, that he realizes the legality of his own existence” (Sartre, 1948: 22–23). It is in opposition to the Jew, and the Jew alone, that the antiSemite realizes the justifiability of his own existence. The existence of the Jew or the black allows the racist to persuade himself at birth that his place in the world was pre-given or pre-ordained and therefore that he has a divine or traditional right to occupy it. Such a consciousness does not only persuade itself to believe that its existence is justified and necessary and therefore that it has a right to live but also questions the right of others to exist. However, Sartre’s conception of racism as “Other—Thought” is, as we have shown earlier, not adequate as a convincing account of antiblack racism according to which a black person is not an Other but a non-Other.

It is generally recognized that the main differentiating racial characteristics of the black are phenotypical, for example, skin color, texture of the hair, facial bone structure, shape of the nose and lips, in short, the body. Other alleged characteristics such as intellectual inferiority are predicated upon the contingent fact of black bodily being. The antiblack seized upon this contingent fact and transformed it into a myth that serves as justification for racism. In Barthes’s opinion, myth has “the task of giving an historical intention a natural justification and making contingency appear eternal” (1972: 142). The myth takes the form of three arguments, namely (1) the Naturalistic Argument, (2) the Psychological Argument, and (3) the Religious Argument.

NATURALISTIC ARGUMENT

Consider all things in nature that are good, pleasant, beautiful, and desirable. These are always symbolically associated with whiteness, light, or brightness. On the contrary, whatever is evil, repulsive, ugly, and undesirable is always symbolically associated with blackness and darkness. In nature, there are permanent pairs of binary oppositions: day and night, growth and decay, life and death, cleansing and dirtying, and so on. Vegetation flourishes in the sunlight of day. In the absence of sunlight, and consequently the presence of darkness, vegetation would die. In blackness or darkness there cannot be life. Blackness is fundamentally opposed to life while whiteness or light promotes life. Similarly, night and its accompanying darkness bring about all that is dreaded; horrible things happen in the darkness of night. Cleanliness brings about health and life, while dirt is the repository of sickness and death (Austin, 1979). Each pair of the binaries from nature, therefore, has the dual characteristic of being good or evil. That which is evil is associated with blackness and the good with whiteness. A Manichean world emerges from which the cosmos is conceived in terms of a struggle between Good and Evil.

To repeat what I pointed out earlier, there are no white people in the sense of the whiteness of snow. The “whiteness” of people is a constructed or imagined whiteness. At the most, phenomenologically speaking, there are light and dark human beings, not white and black. People with “white” skin color became evaluated or evaluated themselves positively in line with the positive or good characteristics associated with whiteness, light, brightness in nature. “Black” skinned people, on the other hand, became negatively evaluated and associated with all the bad or evil things of darkness. In other words, for a racist consciousness, that which is good is white and that which is bad is black. After all, God and Jesus are assumed to be white while the devil is portrayed as black. No one, even black people, can imagine God as not white. As a result, Gordon argues that “from the standpoint of the white in an antiblack world, God is the hoped for ‘we’ upon whom the white assumption of being God can be deferred. Since whiteness is the ideal, the white man is either God or as close to God as anyone can be on earth” (1995: 149). Gordon then concludes, “Hence only the white can reflect upon himself as being pre-reflectively linked to God in his essential feature of value: his whiteness” (1995: 150).

To substantiate this myth, the racist develops an a posteriori proof of the specific incarnation of evil. Like Penny Sparrow, the antiblack claims that one need only look at these blacks and one will immediately perceive the “nature of their vile being.” In dictionaries and encyclopedias, the word “Negro” is defined in negative terms. All the characteristics attributed to the Negro in such definitions are those that are assumed to be antithetical to or in opposition to those attributed to Europeans (whites). If Negroes are ugly, whites are beautiful. Binaries are constructed: flat-nose–pointed nose, thick lips–thin lips, idleness–industriousness, cruelty–merciful, lying–truthful, revengeful–forgiveness, and so on. Thus, antiblack racism, in its origin, is Manichean; it explains the way of the world through the struggle between the forces of Good and Evil.

This myth, Sartre argues, is inscribed in the very languages of Europe in which “white” and “black” are connected on a hierarchical system. “The Negro will learn to say ‘white like snow’ to indicate innocence, to speak of the blackness of a look, of a soul, of a deed. As soon as he opens his mouth, he accuses himself . . . can you imagine the strange savor that an expression like ‘the blackness of innocence’ or ‘the darkness of virtue’ would have for us?” (Sartre, 1988: 304).

Nature, from the point of view of this argument, has condemned inferior races and consecrated the superior race. Accordingly, antiblack racism is natural because it “is in Nature since it is a natural fact that the black is inferior to the white. It is by divine right since Nature in a created world is ordered according to the will of God” (Sartre, 1992: 269–270). But what parcels out the superior from the inferior race is their genetic or physical structure. Connect this to the conception of the pairs attributed to nature above, the superior race would be the one associated with whiteness and the inferior associated with blackness. The antiblack, therefore, produces the black in order to found and justify himself or herself [their self] by giving himself a sens and raison d’être. For, blackness in and by itself has no value or meaning except the value and meaning we confer on it.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Every group requires the Other for self-consciousness, self-knowledge, and self-essentiality. Hence, because of certain biological contingencies rather than historical events, antiblack consciousness has succeeded in turning the black subject into an Absolute Other, that is, into non-Otherness. To maintain this unique alterity (non-Otherness), it was necessary, therefore, to construct all kinds of myths about blacks. Fanon, using Carl Jung’s “collective unconscious” as a theoretical point of departure, argues that Europeans construct myths, collective attitudes, and prejudices (what Jung calls the “collective unconscious”) about the black person. In these myths, blacks are the uncivilized primitive savages and often animals. This European collective unconscious is responsible for the myth and symbolism of evil associated with black personhood. In Europe, Fanon says, the black man is the symbol of Evil. To an antiblack consciousness, black people symbolize everything negative. Put differently, for Fanon, “In the collective unconscious of homo occidentalis, the Negro—or if one prefers, the color black—symbolizes evil, sin, wretchedness, death, war, famine” (1967: 190–191).

Another form of psychological argument, which is a product of projection, and even repression, is the whites’ ascription to black of animalistic behavior, the most important of which is the presumed inexhaustible black libido. Projection is the endowment of attributes which the subject him/ herself possesses and which are perhaps socially unacceptable to another person. Another way of putting it, projection is a form of dealing with anxiety, whether moral, neurotic, or reality anxiety by attributing the source of this anxiety to another individual. An example of projection might come in this form; instead of “I hate him,” a person projects his hatred to another person and say: “He hates me.” In the case of white people’s attribution of sexual libido to blacks, Ephraim writes:

The attribution of an inexhaustible libido to black people has made them more susceptible than any other people to social transgressions, not necessarily because of any wrongdoing on their part, but primarily because of the European’s terror of the sexual instinct before which he feels [they feel] powerless, irredeemably impotent. It is this terror that he projects onto the world and onto black people in particular (2003: 327)

Chabani Manganyi, a clinical psychologist, who I shall later discuss, writing about the “the body-for-others” has the following to say about projection as a means of scapegoating or bad faith:

The negative values associated with blackness (blackness as dirt, impurity, smell) become vehicles in race supremacist cultures for the racist’s attempts to adapt to his [their] estrangement from the reality of his [their] body. The projection of these undesirable attributes of the human body to the victim of racism as a convenient scapegoat, is part and parcel of the process of denial and self-deception which characterises the culture heroics of Western culture and civilisation. (1981: 113)

As indicated above by Judge Mabel Jansen’s and Louise Mibille’s ascription of rape to black men, one of the myths by antiblack racists is inextricably connected with sex. Always lurking behind antiblack racist practices is the fantasized fears and desires about the sexuality of black people. This is what is sometimes referred to as the psychosexual explanation of antiblack racism, a psychological creation of the sexual Frankenstein’s monster in blacks who comes back to haunt the creator. Throughout the history of the encounter between African people (blacks) and Europeans, sex has been a hidden dominant feature that determined relations between the two groups. Because of this, the black man has become a phobogenic object to non-black peoples, a stimulus of anxiety and extreme fear. In their fantasy claims, Europeans have spread the myth that black people are aggressively libidinous, people possessed by an indomitable, indefatigable sex drive, and oversexed creatures. By the eighteenth century, the sexuality of the black, both male and female, had become an icon for deviant sexuality. If their sexuality and their sexual parts could be shown to be inherently different, this would be a sufficient indication or demonstration that the blacks were a separate and lower species from whites and as different from the European as the proverbial Orangutan. The difference was mainly confined to the sexual parts of black people: the black man’s assumed extra-large penis and the black woman’s (Hottentot Venus—Saartie Bartmann) extended buttocks and the “remarkable development of the labia minoria, or nymphae” (Flower and Murie, 1867). For the antiblack white person the black man is the object to which real or imagined fears of sexual impotency or inadequacy are transferred and fixed. In other words, the black man (African) is phobogenic, that is, he instills fear and anxiety. Thus, from this point of view, black men, on the one hand, are lascivious, potential rapists—each desiring to go to bed, especially with a white woman. Black women, on the other hand, are presumed to be wanton temptresses, wild seductresses of white men, or “amazons” (Cleaver, 1968).

RELIGIOUS ARGUMENT

In an antiblack world, the religious argument appeals to the scriptures to establish black non-Otherness.3 The Bible which most black people revere is heavily laden with negative images, symbolisms, and narratives of blackness. It identifies blackness with evil, disaster, famine, plagues, doom, ugliness, and with the invocation of the story of the curse of Ham to account for racial difference, antiblack racism in the Bible becomes evident. From this biblical narrative, blackness is the color of those who have been condemned to perpetual servitude of being “the hewers of wood and drawers of water.” Even the Ku Klux Klan, John L. Jackson argues, used the Bible and Christian religion to justify their racist beliefs. According to him, the Ku Klux Klan was more a religious cult than anything else. As he puts it: “It was the Klan’s commitment to the Bible, a literal reading with racial inflections, that provided moral weight for their holy crusade against racial amalgamation and blacks’ shortlived political gains during Reconstruction” (2008: 58). Another popular version of this religious argument is that of the “Chosen People.” This argument has had a number of adherents in the world, more so in countries founded on imperialist aggression. America has been described as “God’s own country.” Herman Melville is reported as saying: “We Americans are peculiar, chosen people, the Israel of our times” (Degenaar in Sundermeier, 1975: 25). Cecil John Rhodes justified British imperialism in the following words:

Only one race . . . approach God’s ideal type, his own Anglo-Saxon race; God’s purpose then was to make the Anglo-Saxon race predominant, and the best way to help on God’s work and fulfil His purpose in the world was to contribute to the predominance of the Anglo-Saxon race and so bring nearer the reign of justice, liberty and peace. (Degenaar in Sundermeier, 1975: 25)

The myth of the chosen people has also been a dominant feature of the Afrikaner justification for Apartheid in South Africa. Time after time the neo-Fichteans (Dr Nico Diedrichs and P. J. Meyer) and the Kuyperian Calvinists (H. G. Stoker and L. J. Du Plessis) described themselves as God’s chosen people to oversee both South Africa and the blacks. Some of their pronouncements as cited by Degenaar include: “Afrikanerdom is not the work of man, but a creation of God. We have a divine right to be Afrikaners” (in Sundermeier, 1975: 25). Afrikaners considered themselves chosen by God and destined to control and rule blacks through the grace of God and his holy wisdom. Now recently in the “post”-apartheid South Africa, this religious justification of racism played itself out through a white owner of a Guest House (Sodwana Bay Guest House) in northern KwaZulu-Natal, who after refusing to accommodate black people as guests, claimed that, according to the Bible, blacks are not people and that apartheid is dictated by God. In an interview with Jacinta Ngobese, a black presenter of the radio show, The Brunch, Andre Slade, the owner of the Guest House, said to the presenter: “You are classified in the Bible as an animal, you are not homo-sapiens” (June 24, 2016). The religious concept of “the chosen people” has its origin from this desire for justification.4

A variant of this argument sometimes incorporates the naturalistic argument to justify black oppression. Since nature is the creation of God, and since blacks are by natural design, by God’s will, inferior to whites, then white superiority is a divine right. Sartre cites Thomas Dew’s assertion about natural and divine order of superiority and inferiority among races: “It is the natural and divine order that those endowed with superior faculties . . . make use of and control the inferior beings” (Sartre, 1984: 570). This religious justification of antiblack racism introduces a theodicean problematic which ultimately led William Jones to pose the question as a title of his book: Is God a White Racist? (1998).5 This is a legitimate question given the fact that the Bible itself gives credence to racial oppression through narratives such as the “Curse of Ham.”

#### Abstraction DA-- durable fiat indoctrinates us to embrace a sovereign view of power that embraces the will to control while mastering obstacles through technocracy -- that trains us to be aggressive intellects.

**Makau ’96** [Josina; 1996; Professor of Humanities and Communication at CSU Monterey Bay; *Responsible Communication: Ethical Issues in Business, Industry, and the Professions*, “Argumentation Instruction in the Face of Global Perils,” p. 140]

Weisel's critique of German education prior to world war II points to another danger of traditional argumentation instruction. Like the Nazi doctors, students in traditional argumentation courses are taught "how to reduce life and the mystery of life to abstraction." Weisel urges educators to teach students what the Nazi doctors never learned -- that people are not abstractions. Weisel urges educators to learn from the Nazi experience the importance of humanizing their charges, of teaching students to view life as special, 'with its own secrets, its own treasures, its own sources of anguish and with some measure of triumph.' Trained as technocrats with powerful sensory skills but little understanding, students participating in traditional argumentation courses would have difficulty either grasping or appreciating the importance of Weisel's critique. Similarly, they would have difficulty grasping or appreciating Christian's framework for an ethic of technology an approach that requires above all, openness, trust and care. The notion of conviviality would be particularly alien to these trained technocrats. Traditionally trained debaters are also likely to fail to grasp the complexity of issues.

Trained to view problems in black and white terms and conditioned to turn to "expertise" for solutions, students, and traditional courses become subject to ethical blindness. As Benhabib noted, 'Moral blindness implies not necessarily an evil or unprincipled person, but one who can not see the moral texture of the situation confronting him or her.' These traditional debaters, deprived of true dialogic encounter, fail to develop 'the capacity to represent' to themselves the 'multiplicity of viewpoints, the variety of perspectives, the layers of meaning, etc. which constitute a situation'. They are thus inclined to lack 'the kind of sensitivity to particulars, which most agree is essential for good and perspicacious judgment.' Encouraging students to embrace the will to control and to gain mastery, to accept uncritically a sovereign view of power, and to maintain distance from their own and others 'situatedness,' the traditional argumentation course provides an unlikely site for nurturing guardians of our world's precious resources. It would appear, in fact, that the argumentation course foster precisely the 'aggressive and manipulative intellect bred by modern science and discharged into the administration of things' associated with most of the world's human made perils. And is therefore understandable that feminist and others critics would write so harshly of traditional argumentation of debate.

#### White Thought DA-- This White God demands White thought – rationality as doctrine becomes the founding logic of their church built by slaves.

Errouaki & Nell 13 (Karim, Senior Research Fellow for the Culture of Peace at the Autonomous University of Madrid; Edward, American Economist and Former Professor at the New School of Social Research *Rational Econometric Man: Transforming Structural Economics*) NIJ

Hollis and Nell begin by examining the methodology embodied in every neoclassical theory or analysis - that is, how neoclassical economists explain the behaviour of the decision-makers in the economy. The rational decision-maker's methodology is the primary topic of their book; it is what underlies virtually all specific neoclassical theories. This is rational choice theory, and although modifications and weaker versions are often used, it can nevertheless be argued that this picture dominates the economists' explanation not only of the economy, but also of their own behaviour with respect to methodology. That is, economists apply the rational choice paradigm to their own behaviour, for example, in choosing models to work with. Economists choose to model consumer behaviour by rational choice, instead of, for instance, drawing on models of social norms or psychological urges - and they argue that this is the right choice because it maximizes the return from their theories. A consequence of this self-referential dominance of rational choice on the economic theorist's methodology is that it is almost impossible for neoclassicists to see methodology as a problem. The question of what method to employ is itself simply a matter of rational choice - choose the method that will yield the greatest return subject to the constraints. (The 'satisficing' approach is fully consistent with this - maximizing is too costly at the margin.) Thus the methodology practised by neoclassical economists will be the same as the methodology assumed to be the basis of the individual decision-making process. The remarkable unity between these two perspectives - Economists choose the method of rational choice by making what they regard as an optimal choice among possible methods - means that economists tend to regard rational choice as a kind of 'natural' given. It is simply the way we think about economic questions. However, the authors argue, rational choice, far from being a natural given, is a defective construct, one of the major shortcomings of neoclassical economics. The way rational choice is conceived, and the role chosen for it, which dominates neoclassical theory, both in practice and in its conception of rational decision-making, is based on an inadequate theory of knowledge. The objective, then, as Hollis and Nell would have put it, is to show that death at the roots kills the fruit on the branches. We turn now to the foundations as problems.

#### The project of Afrofuturism and spiritual healing overcomes antiblack hierarchies the relegate blackness into the position of death.

**McCormack 21** [Michael Brandon McCormack, Associate Professor in Religious Studies, and Director of Undergraduate Studies at Vanderbilt University, Black Theology “We Ain’t Dead Said the Children’: A Fugitive Poetics of Life After black Death”, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14769948.2021.1990499>, JMH]

Badu’s Afrofuturist vision involves an acknowledgement of anti-blackness and its violent workings, which have shaped the Americas into what Rinaldo Walcott has referred to as zones of death.8 **Whereas these zones of death**, especially in the United States, **have claimed the lives of countless young Black people through state-sanctioned, vigilante, and other modes of violence and premature Black death**, **Badu gives voice to those forced to navigate these zones of death, allowing us to hear their persistence and insistence upon Black life in the face of death.** “We ain’t dead, said the children, don’t believe it,” becomes a poetic assertion of Black life. To be sure, it is not a denial of Black death. Rather, Badu’s children deny being dead. While Black death might be the context in which Black life is lived, or constitutive of the structural conditions under which Black life takes on meaning, it is another thing altogether to reduce Black life to social death, in such a way that renders Black people always already and only “dead.”

Whereas the Black subject might have a “life” that is constituted by and only made intelligible through death, as has been claimed by various thinkers within and beyond Afropessimism, Badu’s children insist “We ain’t dead.” To accept the status of “dead” (socially or otherwise) and for Afropessimists, “nothing,” not just in the white western imagination and social order, but as an incontrovertible ontological “fact” of Black being, is to foreclose on any meaningful claims to the value and worth of Black life.9 Though Badu’s hip-hop children have been relegated to “spaces of death” and left for dead, they resist, reject, and refuse “dead” as an overdetermining description of their being in the world.10 While others might have resigned themselves to being always already dead, insofar as they are racialized as Black in an anti-Black world, Badu’s children insist that they are neither dead, nor consent to a fatalistic response to the violent forces of Black death.

For emphasis, the final verse repeats the claim, adding “Told you, we ain’t dead yet.” Not only do they demand “disbelief” in white epistemological and ontological claims concerning blackness as tantamount to death, and being dead, but they also insist “we been living through your internet.” “Your internet,” becomes a space of Black fugitivity, wherein “the children” engage in a praxis of what Kevin Quashie has recently called “Black aliveness.” 11 This is not to suggest, as Ruha Benjamin has made clear in her recent work, Race After Technology, that “the internet” is a space of Black thriving, “lived” outside the all-encompassing “zones of death” in the Americas or other diasporic deathscapes.12 Rather, **it is to say that Badu’s children claim that they have created and held fugitive space within the violent constraints of these zones of death that allow for modes, or “technologies” of “living” Black life that are neither disentangled from, nor overdetermined by Black death.13**

It is precisely through a fugitive poetics of “making” themselves “invisible,” even as they are always hyper-visible and subject to technologies of surveillance, that Badu’s children create fugitive space for “technologies of living” within, through, and beyond the “internet.” In so doing, **they find refuge in a virtual undercommons, or what Moten describes as a “bent school or marginal church,” where they gain access to alternative epistemologies that produce modes of (spiritual) discernment that challenge the ways Black subjects have been “programmed” to “believe” a set of metaphysical and theological claims that position “the Black” as always already dead.**14 Though Black subjects are constantly inundated with anti-Black thought (and theologies) that threatens to undermine liberative Black agency, and to reinforce self-loathing views and self/community-destructive behaviours that perpetuate anti-Black violence and premature death, Badu’s children insist “you don’t have to believe everything you think.” This is to say that Black subjects need not (must not!) give their intellectual consent to, internalise, nor “believe” deathdealing modes of modernist thought, including theologies, that define what it means to be human over against the figure of “the Black,” which can only be understood as representative of death, “depravity,” and/or “evil.” 15 Badu’s children call for Black subjects to recognise the “programming” of anti-Black thought, to “wake up,” embrace a decolonised “African” identity, and to be “baptised in the ocean of the people.” This baptism into the watery grave of Black social life-against-death holds out the possibility of healing, which offers the potential for renewed prospects for Black futurity. Through these lyrics, Badu offers an Afrofuturist spiritual invitation to “reboot, refresh, restart” in order to realise a “new day” in a “new key” of Black life.

### Case

#### Brunelle evidence, which says:

NPs have taken their passion for improving patient care to the **policy level**

#### 4---Concepts of health and care are weaponized against blackness---whiteness defines the education of nurses which means that increasing nurses only increases the forms of parasitism they seek to eliminate

Bonini '21 -University of Colorado, College of Nursing [Susan and Cheryl Matais, "The impact of Whiteness on the education of nurses," Journal of Professional Nursing Volume 37, Issue 3, May–June 2021, Pages 620-625]

How does Whiteness impact nursing?

Whiteness is present in our educational institutions from kindergarten to higher educational institutions, similar to teacher education (Matias, 2016). Giddens (2008) contended that while the nursing literature identified the challenges ethnic and non-traditional students face, there is an unwillingness to recognize the institutional culture in BSN programs, which impacts how POC feel about enrolling.

Nursing education programs are located in highly competitive, and highly structured environments, which emphasize conformity and individual achievement, none of which appeals to the non-traditional student (Giddens, 2008). Moreover, Bell (2020) argued that nursing and nursing education operate within the social and political context of institutions of higher education and healthcare with racialized beliefs. Furthermore, the current nursing education process invisibly integrates and perpetuates whiteness, Christianity, heteronormativity, and middle-class aspirations, which is why these programs are unattractive to non-traditional students.

In sum, one of the most insidious and invisible barriers to improving diversity in the nursing workforce is due to the presence of whiteness in nursing education. Some examples of how the presence of whiteness can impact nursing during the education of nurses include admission criteria, nursing education, and whiteness in healthcare.

Admission criteria

The complexity of disease management and prevention coupled with the explosion of scientific knowledge, has demanded a more highly educated nurse and faculty. More highly educated nurses are being asked to help meet the growing healthcare needs of the nation. By developing a greater range of skills to meet the needs of patients, greater access to quality healthcare can be offered. Furthermore, many hospitals require RNs to have a BSN degree upon hire. The nursing profession has responded by working with university-based nursing programs to create academic progression programs to a BSN degree.

Efforts to achieve this goal of increasing the number of BSN prepared RNs, while increasing the diversity of the workforce, has been challenging. With the increased number of highly qualified applicants, who exceed the minimum grade point average (GPA), all vie for a limited number of positions in university-based BSN programs. This decreases the likelihood of applicants who meet even the minimum GPA criteria from being selected. Relying only on GPA scores, creates several disadvantages for POC. For one, the Sullivan Commission on Diversity in the Healthcare Workforce (Sullivan, 2004) reported that POC students still found it difficult to gain admission into health professional schools due to the over reliance on standardized metrics, which are known to be historically racially biased in the admission process. The report (2004) noted, “there was a time when admission to colleges was limited by race, sex national origin and religion and while the civil rights movement ended the more visible barriers, entrenched patterns of inequality in the health professions remain” (p. 4).

Additionally, Sullivan (2004) reported, “the burden of financing the education in the health professions put the dream of too many well qualified, underrepresented POC students out of reach” (p. 8). The barriers that racially diverse students face to gain admission into university-based nursing programs, are similar to those reported by Sullivan (2004), therefore university-based programs tend to attract and admit predominately White female students who meet or exceed academic admission requirements and who can afford the steep cost of tuition. These White females often come from middle to upper class communities whose K-12 students had better access to resources (Matias, 2016) and outperform POC on standardized tests (Sullivan, 2004).

In a study by Condon et al. (2013), characteristics that inhibit enrollment into a university-based nursing program were identified. The characteristics were three distinct subsets. The first was related to being educationally disadvantaged, which included a non-competitive GPA, academic under preparation, inadequate study skills, no previous degree, first generation college student, and one who learned English as a second language (Condon et al., 2013; Scott & Zerwic, 2015). These factors were seen as directly inhibiting the student from obtaining the knowledge, and skills necessary to be successful in health professional education (Brooks Carthon et al., 2014; HRSA, 2016; Scott & Zerwic, 2015). Yet, what this does not consider, is access to equitable education that adequately prepares POC. Thus, comparing those with quality educational preparation to those who have not, is an inequitable comparison. The second subset related to being economically disadvantaged with low-income levels and lack of financial resources resulting in the need for students to work. The last subset were those related to social capital such as, lack of family support, being a single parent, being a first generation college student, lack of role models and those individuals who represent racial or ethnic groups inadequately represented in the nursing workforce (HRSA, 2016; Loftin et al., 2012; Scott & Zerwic, 2015). Yet again, this relies on pejorative deficit perspectives of POC. Although most welfare recipients are White females, the stereotypes of single mothers on welfare, are overwhelmingly attributed to Black mothers.

Hayes-Bautista et al. (2016) reported in their study, that Latinos faced many challenges trying to gain access to university-based BSN programs due to the sheer volume of applicants vying for too few slots. Some of the Latino students in their study were denied admission to college-based programs because they repeated courses while enrolled in their community college, which was considered a predictor of future academic failure. This left some Latino students, desperate to pursue a career in nursing, from for-profit schools (Hayes-Bautista et al., 2016).

Nursing education

The National League of Nursing (NLN, 2020) published the results of the 2018–2019 faculty survey that showed 82% of full-time nurse educators identified as White, as a result the dominant cultural norms are reproduced. Giddens (2008) notes how curricular and pedagogical practices in nursing education reflect a traditional model of learning, thinking and teaching, which excludes others. Traditional pedagogy ignores those whose learning styles are cognitively or culturally different and relies on a more teacher centric approach with the expectation that the student must adapt. The consequences students face whose learning style differs, results in endless academic struggle, anxiety and stress over their ability to progress in the program (Giddens, 2008; Puzan, 2003). Research by Hall (1984) was instrumental in exposing the different ways many cultural groups understand, communicate and interpret meaning from their world. How one understands and interprets the world around them differs depending on their cultural context. Hall (1984) noted that students from cultural groups such as Native Americans, Latin Americans, African Americans and Asian American, relied on variety of communication modes to understand their world. When students from such cultural groups are taught in nursing programs that embody Northern European cultural methods of understanding the world, which use fewer modes of communication, they may be unable to adapt their learning styles to the traditional teaching model (Giddens, 2008; Hall, 1984). Giddens (2008) noted that understanding the cultural context of how various cultural groups communicate provides a greater understanding the challenges students face in nursing program.

Morton (2019) argued that the changing student demographic, is a wakeup call for higher education to ‘reinvent student services to include assistance with budgeting, childcare and other services that help students beyond their academic demands’ (p. 425). In addition, nurse educators, must be able to offer more flexible modalities for the non-traditional student to access courses (Morton, 2019). Approximately 85% of university students work while enrolled, while others are trying to balance childcare or caring for older or sick relatives with their education (Morton, 2019).

Schroeder and DiAngelo (2010) argued that instead of including antiracist education in nursing curriculum, course content focusing on cultural competence is the norm, leaving institutionalized structures of White privilege and racism intact (p. 245). Tillmann (1992) argued that adding cultural diversity content to nursing education, has done little to change racial prejudice toward patients and minority nurses. For example, Hall and Fields (2013) observed that nurses are often taught about sickle cell disease as it relates to African Americans, but not the fact that sickle cell and the trait can occur in other groups of people as well. Not having a full understanding of the people who are affected by sickle cell traits may cause a nurse to fail to assess for this trait in other groups. This example illustrates how Eurocentric perspectives, are woven in the curricula and textbooks and can negatively affect what students learn (Cech et al., 2011). Bryne (2001) explored the presence or absence of racial bias in textbooks and found stereotyping and overgeneralizations were made related to difference. Biologic descriptors about normal hair texture and skin color were slanted toward a Eurocentric perspective and assessment findings related to European Americans were often placed ahead of POC (Bryne, 2001).

Schroeder and DiAngelo (2010) reported that while the curriculum in their nursing program ‘included required content on cultural competence’ (p. 246), power dynamics, racism and White privilege were not addressed. Despite the requirement to include cultural issues, finding evidence of its existence is still prevented by the presence of whiteness in higher education. The lack of critical examination of course content under the guise of academic freedom, helps to reinforce patterns of whiteness (Puzan, 2003).

The lack of cultural education doesn't prepare nurses who participate in a healthcare system (that serves mostly Whites), learn how to assess and care for POC (Allen, 2006). In one of the author's experience, the content of care plans and assessment findings are consistently framed in White cultural norms, and rarely take into consideration, cultural or ethnic difference. For example, to assess good oxygenation and circulation to the extremities, one is taught to assess for the skin color to be pink, which assumes the patient's skin color is White. What are students taught if the patient's skin color contains more melanin? Are they taught how to assess for adequate oxygenation in POC?

Not only is a Eurocentric perspective found in the curricula, White perspectives can be found in nursing research. As nursing was evolving as a profession, the importance of evolution of nursing research became more important as a way to illustrate the scientific evidence to support practice. The American Association of Colleges of Nursing (2006) published a statement about the importance of nursing research and its translational approach to science. The challenge for nursing education is that Western science is linked to Whiteness and is foundational to nursing curricula and practice (Scammell & Olumide, 2012). Jackson (1993) found a continuation of racism in nursing research that rarely critiqued the individualistic point of view that dominates nursing research, theory, practice and education (p. 371). The lack of a sociocultural critique of the barriers that exist in the healthcare system, causes care to focus on the individual's motivation or lack of knowledge to explain a patient's failed health behaviors instead of looking at the social context of patients (Jackson, 1993).

#### But, their cards are anecdotal and aspirational – statistics are on our side. Black people do not have access to the same healthcare white people have access to, and when they do they get worse treatment.

Rees '20 [Mathieu, 9/16/20, "Racism in healthcare: What you need to know," https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/racism-in-healthcare]

Racial discrimination permeates the healthcare systems of many countries, including the United States. This has negative consequences for both patients and healthcare workers, leading to higher risks of illness and, in some cases, lower standards of care for people of color (POC).

The COVID-19 pandemic draws attention to this. A May 2020 study estimates that in the U. S., Black people were 3.57 times more likely to die from COVID-19 than white people. Similarly, the risk of death within the Latinx population was nearly twice that of the white population.

Data from other countries reveal the same problem. A 2020 report from Public Health England found that in England, COVID-19 death rates were higher among Black and Asian people than white people.

The report also found that healthcare workers from marginalized groups felt unable to voice their concerns about the lack of personal protective equipment and COVID-19 testing in the pandemic’s early stages.

This article explores how racism affects various aspects of U.S. healthcare, including pregnancy, emergency treatment, mental health treatment, and more.

How racism impacts health

Racism in healthcare can have dire consequences.

Racism has a profound impact on mental and physical health, and can make it more difficult for people to access healthcare services.

In 2015, the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)Trusted Source found numerous examples of health inequity for POC in the U.S., including:

Lower life expectancy: In 2014, Black males and females had lower average life expectancies than white males and females.

Higher blood pressure: Between 2013 and 2014, 42.4% of Black males had high blood pressure, compared to 30.2% in white males. During the same period, 44% of Black females also had this condition compared to 28% in white females.

Lower rates of influenza (flu) vaccination: Flu vaccines can save lives. However, in 2014, only 60% of Black and Latinx people aged 65 or over got a vaccination, compared to 70% of white and Asian people of the same age.

Strain on mental health: A 2015 reviewTrusted Source found that racism was strongly associated with mental health difficulties, contributing to stress, anxiety, and depression. This was especially true for Asian American and Latinx groups.

Some of these findings are influenced by racial inequality that exists outside of the healthcare system. For example, economic disparities between racial groups make it more difficult for some to get health insurance, preventing people from getting medical care.

In 2014, around 20% of Black adults could not access health insurance compared to 10% in white and Asian adults. For Latinx adults, this figure was 35%. A 2012 study also found that predominantly Black zip codes were 67% more likelyTrusted Source to have a shortage of primary care physicians (PCPs).

However, racism also exists within healthcare itself and can lead doctors to neglect, disbelieve, or actively discriminate against patients. The following sections look at specific ways of how this manifests.

Health inequities affect all of us differently. Visit our dedicated hub for an in-depth look at social disparities in health and what we can do to correct them.

Pain treatment

A 2016 study found many white medical students wrongly believe Black people have a higher pain tolerance than white people. Of all the participants, 73% held at least one false belief about the biological differences between races.

Examples of these beliefs include Black people having thicker skin, less sensitive nerve endings, or stronger immune systems. The researchers note these beliefs are centuries old, and that some 19th-century doctors used them to justify the inhumane treatment of slaves.

These myths still have an impact today. In a previous study, Black children with appendicitis were less likely to receive appropriate pain medication than white children. The same was true in research on people with recurring cancer.

Emergency care

In addition to the limited accessTrusted Source to trauma centers that people in predominantly Black areas have, evidence suggests racial bias may prevent POC from receiving emergency care.

For example, according to Frontiers in Pediatrics, doctors in emergency departments (EDs) are less likely to:

classify Black and Latinx children as requiring emergency care compared to white or Asian children

admit Black or Latinx children to the hospital after visiting the ED

order blood tests, CT scans, or X-rays for Black, Latinx, or Asian children compared to white children

This study did not look at the cause of these differences. However, the researchers say they cannot be explained by social, economic, or clinical factors that would change how doctors treat POC in emergencies.

Differences in emergency care also apply to adults. A 2020 study shows that between 2005 and 2016, medical professionals were 10% less likelyTrusted Source to admit Black patients to the hospital than white patients. It also suggests Black people were 1.26 times more likely to die in the ED or hospital.

Pregnancy

Racial disparities also affect the medical care of pregnant people and newborn babies.

The term “infant mortality” refers to the proportion of babies who die below the age of one compared to those that live. Organizations often use infant mortality to measure the success of postnatal healthcare.

Between 1999–2013, infant mortality tended to decrease in the U.S. However, there were still disparities between racial groups. The following 2013 data comes from the HHSTrusted Source:

Group Infant mortality

Black 11 in 1,000

Indigenous 8 in 1,000

White and Latinx 5 in 1,000

Asian or Pacific Islander 4 in 1,000

Black people also face higher risks during pregnancy. According to a 2019 studyTrusted Source, they are 3–4 times more likely to die from pregnancy-related causes than white people in the U.S.

Chronic illness

Chronic illnesses are long-term health conditions that can severely impact someone’s quality of life. Sometimes, they can cause disability and require ongoing medical care.

A 2019 study found that Black people aged 51–55 were 28% more likelyTrusted Source to already have a chronic illness compared to white people of the same age. The study also found that Latinx people of the same age accumulated chronic diseases faster than white people.

The researchers note numerous factors may affect this, such as chronic stress, chronic inflammation, lower rates of insurance coverage, and less access to quality healthcare or PCPs.

Mental health

According to Mental Health America (MHA), mental illness rates are roughly equivalent between some marginalized groups and white people. However, there are some significant areas of difference, such as:

Disability

Overall, Black people experience a disproportionate amount of disability from mental health conditions compared to white people. Depression in Black and Latinx people is also more likely to be persistent.

Schizophrenia

Black males are four times more likely to receive a schizophrenia diagnosis than white males. MHA suggests this is because clinicians can overlook the symptoms of depression and focus more on psychotic symptoms when treating Black people.

Addiction

Native and Indigenous Americans have the highest alcohol dependence rates out of any marginalized group. Conversely, Asian Americans may be under-diagnosed.

A 2016 study suggests doctors are less likely to diagnose alcohol addiction in Asian Americans compared to white people, despite having the same symptoms.

This may occur due to the “model minority” stereotype, which frames Asian Americans as successful and self-reliant. The implicit bias this creates may lead doctors to overlook signs that Asian American patients require help.

#### 4---The caring state is endemic to democratic politics---even if the aff is a “new framing” of care, it still falls back into the same tropes of American exceptionalism their evidence critiques---which means even if our evidence is older, it better accounts for their phenomenon across time

Sharron, 19 - Kelly Christina Sharron, Doctorate in Philosophy from the University of Arizona, 2019(“THE CARING STATE: THE POLITICS OF CONTRADICTION IN FERGUSON, MISSOURI,” Proquest Dissertations Library, bam)

As I was writing during the 2016 U.S. election, I considered the election to be part of the pageantry of the caring state. On the one hand there was the establishment Democratic party attempting to appease, and give lip service to more progressive liberals, all the while continuing what had been business as usual politics: large donors, the neoliberal doctrine, and the continuation of status quo power and privilege. On the other, there was what seemed to be a circus with a large field of candidates giving way to an explicitly sexist, racist, and billionaire populist. Democrats and Hillary Clinton seemed content to define themselves through distance from the more violent rhetoric of President Trump’s campaign. Instead of offering substantive change, Democrats presented the continuation of the status quo, nothing radical, nothing revolutionary, but not Trump. It seemed like the perfect moment to define the caring state, and as though Trump had presented its violent foil. The caring state upholds personal liberty, it praises the inclusion of difference, it wags its finger at the violent state apparatus, with a little wink behind everyone’s backs. Before the election, it seemed somewhat nauseating to continue to praise, and vote in favor of, the caring state, but at least it was better than the alternative (which of course is precisely the point – be gracious because it could be much worse).

This dissertation develops the caring state within the context of Brown’s death in Ferguson, Missouri, and the events of the next year that followed, roughly the time period of 2014-2015. It was a time defined by the Obama presidency, referenced many times throughout this dissertation, as marking the progress of the nation. President Obama, and other people of color in leadership was indicative of the ways the state had changed. It was the hallmark of care, the ability of leaders to empathize and understand the charges of racism, and to be able to frame that pain within the state rubric. This dissertation has been critical of inclusion, empathy, and care as state strategies and techniques to further violence. Much of the analysis in this dissertation is grounded in the rhetoric of President Obama and his appointees like Attorney General Eric Holder. The connection between caring and the state seemed to rely on what had now become Democratic party principles. President Trump and his supporters seemed to favor a much bolder, more violent will of the state that can’t neatly be captured by care. This violent rhetoric was obvious with regard to the U.S./Mexico border and the prison industrial complex, inciting rational fear, the effects of which have been made evident in the years since.

After the 2016 election, it seemed as if the caring state had given way, or returned, to the violent state. Instead of tolerance and inclusion, there was a return to hate speech, exclusion, and the shrinking sphere of legal protections. In the wake of Trump’s election and in the myriad of racist, homophobic, and transphobic people being appointed to new positions of leadership, the topic of state violence rose to prominence, not inflected through any particular moment, but as an overarching sense of doom. Movements formerly on the fringes of mainstream hate now have a President that speaks to and for them, and one who has the power to wield the American war machine. In this conclusion, I discuss the contemporary political moment, and ask if the caring state is indeed over. Returning to Ahmed’s original query about Britain, was the U.S. election also a reaction to being “soft?” Is the election of Donald Trump a reaction to care? Here I frame Trump’s rise to power as a transition from the pseudotolerant neoliberalism to the fascist impulses of populism. Rather than as a distinct break, these forms of governance exist on a continuum, a continuum that needs to be resisted at all levels, not just at either easily recognizable pole.

After November 8th, 2016, people were forced to grapple with the implications of the election. Two kinds of rhetoric emerged, either that President Trump represents a wholly new kind of leadership, the likes of which we’ve never seen, or a continuation and logical outcome of increased militarization, migration, and economic destitution, trends that arguably started in the wake of World War II. Both explanations seem insufficient to explain the current political landscape, a landscape that has willingly given a voice to the most vile of opinions. The 2016 election had many questioning if we had left neoliberalism and headed toward fascism. Neoliberalism operates by way of consent, albeit a manufactured consent based in economic privatization, unfettered wage gaps, and the collusion of state and capital. Fascism, by contrast, is meant to signify a nationalist, violent, concentrated form of authoritarian governance with a strong leader. The American check on these forms of power has consistently been articulated as representative democracy through voting, term limits, and Constitutional authority vested in the courts. As has always been clear, these checks are insufficient for marginalized populations, and do little to ward off either fascism or neoliberalism. There is nothing new or un-American about anti-Semitism, white supremacy, or heteropatriarchy, and to think there would be short sighted, however new the framing of “alt-right” may be. This is perhaps the greatest flaw in the American democratic experiment and the logic of American exceptionalism - there is nothing inherently moral or ethical about the will of the people.

Neoliberalism and fascism are not as distinct as their common definitions may suggest and both are possible under US democracy. Since the rise of neoliberalism, the transition from “difference” to “diversity” has resulted in the normalization of difference based on its proximity to whiteness, heterosexuality, and upward mobility. Difference has been evaluated based on its offerings to the generalization of the US as a benevolent nation. In other words, minorities are strategically deployed to serve the state’s interests, and those acts of benevolence are only a calculated use of care to mitigate violence. The question of diversity has played out in a puzzling way as people try to grapple with the phenomenon that two-time Obama voters were moved to endorse the racist working-class rhetoric of Trump. The fall of the “blue wall” and the power of angry, white voters in those states of industrial decay are articulated as a failure of the Clinton campaign to take seriously a Republican threat in those blue strongholds and the lack of economic messaging to those areas ravaged by globalization. Throughout his Presidency, Obama contended with increasing racial tensions, the attention paid to police brutality, targeted mass shootings, and the rise of BLM. In the face of white brutality, whiteness resurged and was perceived to be under attack. America, it seems, was growing too diverse, while forgetting the hard work of white Americans that had “made America great.” The very dynamics of care had propelled the electorate to more severe forms of violence.

1. This can be found on Hebru Brantley’s website, under the section ‘About’. Web. May 21st, 2019. <https://www.hebrubrantley.com/about>. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)